On 2/17/2013 9:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

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On 12 Feb 2013, at 03:22, Stephen P. King wrote:On 2/4/2013 11:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 01 Feb 2013, at 20:25, Stephen P. King wrote:On 2/1/2013 5:20 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 11:38 PM, Stephen P. King<stephe...@charter.net <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:On 1/31/2013 4:46 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:What's an entity?Any system whose canonical description can be associated with some kind of fixed point theorem.Ok, do you figure that a human being can be considered an entityunder that definition?Hi Telmo,Recall the phrase "I think therefore I am." The "I" is a fixedpoint under variations of content of experience.Yes. And Descartes limited to the doubts experiences. He tried todoubt all propositions, but then he has to doubt the propositionasserting that he doubts all propositions, that is conceivingcertainty.Dubito ergo cogito. (I doubt thus I think) Cogito ergo sum. (I think thus I am).Hi Bruno,I would add the temporal tense and state: Cogito, ergo eram, "Ithink, therefore I was".But that does not follow.

HI Bruno,

`How so? Is the content of our knowledge always in the present`

`tense? Does this not imply that we are asking for a degenerasy of the`

`temporal tense? If we accept the degenerasy we must be consistent with`

`this in further arguments that require consideration of knowledge.`

This is Löbian, with the classical definition, making Dt such afixed point.I agree. I believe that this is exactly how the ambiguous self ofself or "I" obtains.I don't see the ambiguity. Unless it is the usual "ambiguity" betweentruth and provability, G* and G. Cf G* proves Bp equivalent with Bp &p, and G does not.

`What, generally, acts to make this distinction between truth and`

`provability?`

But neither Descartes, nor any correct Löbian machine, can prove Dt,although the reasoning above validly confirm, from the first personpoint of view, consciousness as undoubtable, with consciousnessbeing something like Dt?, a sort of basic, automated, instinctive,elementary faith in a reality.Could you elaborate on what would happen *if* any correct machinecould indeed prove Dt? What would be the implications?The machine would eventually prove that 0 = 1, implying that you arethe pope, notably.

`How can we even consider the concept of "when" here if we have`

`discounted a difference between past, present and future?`

Thomas Slezak made a similar analysis of the cogito of Descartes.References in the general biblio of "Conscience and Mecanisme".This need the classical definition of knowledge, which is given hereby Thaetetus definition in arithmetic, thanks to incompleteness (themachine cannot know that Bp and Bp & p are equivalent).I am not happy with this negative type of proof. I would like tosee some kind of constructive argument or even an approximation.The proof is not negative. And it is constructive, even if bearing onan impossibility. The machine can build the conterexample. The resultcan be said to be negative, but math is full of such non go theorems.We can't change that at will.

`For me, constructability involves consideration of resource`

`availability but you discount that notion. So why do you invoke`

`constructability here? We cannot change our premises at will! Consider`

`the proof that the halting problem is intractable. ISTM that the halting`

`problem is directly showing that constructability of proofs is dependent`

`on resource availability. If a recursively enumerable function cannot`

`generate a proof is it because there is a limit to ability of`

`recursively enumerable functions. Could there exist a class of functions`

`that do not have this limitation?`

This entails the fact that we can be genuinely aware that we dream,but we can never be genuinely aware that we are awake, (as the usualTuring emulation thought experiences illustrate).This seems to me to be analogous to "we can know for sure that X'is a fake or simulation of X and not the real thing", but itpresupposes a 3p judgement. If one only allows 1p judgements andfinite computational resources, then one must be a fallibist in one'sclaims.?Usually the 3p discourse is always fallible. Only a part of the 1pdiscourse (our own consciousness) is not fallible.

This argues against a TOE, IMHO.

Bruno

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