On 3/19/2013 3:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:

I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit.

My terms are:

                                 Super-Personal Intentional (Intuition)
unintentional (determinism) ------------+-------------- unintentional
                                    Sub-Personal Intentional (Instinct)

+ = Free will = Personal Intentional (Voluntary Preference)
The x axis = Impersonal
I don't think these are definitions, they are arguments. A definition
of "intentional" in the common sense does not normally include
"neither determined nor random". You should start with the normal
definition then show that it could be neither determined nor random.
It is a serious problem in a debate if someone surreptitiously puts
their conclusion into the definition of the terms.

As a diagram of different action it implies there are, in each quadrant, actions that are both "Intentional" and "unintentional". As I said there's no point in arguing with someone who contradicts himself.


So, do you believe that it possible that an entity which is
deterministic from a third person perspective could be conscious, or
do you believe that an entity which is deterministic from a third
person perspective could not possibly be conscious?

Yes, I think all deterministic looking systems represent sensory-motor
participation of some kind, but not necessarily on the level that we
What we see as a cloud may have sensory-motor participation as droplets
water molecules, and as a wisp in the atmosphere as a whole, but not at
as a coherent cloud that we perceive. The cloud is a human scale emblem,
the native entity. The native awareness may reside in a much faster or
slower frequency range or sample rate than our own, so there is little
of our relating to it personally. It's like Flatland only with
relativity rather than quant dimension.
I'm not completely sure but I think you've just said the brain could
be deterministic and still be conscious.

What looks deterministic is not conscious, but what is consciousness can
have be represented publicly by activity which looks deterministic to us.
Nothing is actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual.
If something conscious can look deterministic in every empirical test
then that's as good as saying that the brain could be deterministic. A
computer is deterministic in every empirical test but you could also
say without fear of contradiction that it is "not actually, cosmically
deterministic, only habitual."

This is also why computers are not conscious. The native entity is
microelectronic or geological, not mechanical. The machine as a whole is
again an emblem, not an organic, self-invested whole.
I don't understand what you think the fundamental difference is
between a brain, a cloud and a computer.

A brain is part of an animal's body, which is the public representation of
an animal's lifetime. It is composed of cells which are the public
representation of microbiological experiences.

A cloud is part of an atmosphere, which is the public representation of some
scale of experience - could be geological, galactic, molecular...who knows.

A computer is an assembly of objects being employed by a foreign agency for
its own motives. The objects each have their own history and nature, so that
they relate to each other on a very limited and lowest common denominator
range of coherence. It is a room full or blind people who don't speak the
same language, jostling each other around rhythmically because that's all
they can do.

The brain and body are a four billion year old highly integrated
civilization with thousands of specific common histories. The cloud is more
like farmland, passively cycling through organic phases.
I don't see the relevance of history here. How would it make any
difference to me if the atoms in my body were put there yesterday by a
fantastically improbably whirlwind? I'd still feel basically the same,
though I might have some issues if I learned of my true origin.

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