On Tuesday, March 19, 2013 7:14:14 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: > > On 3/19/2013 3:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg > > <[email protected]<javascript:>> > wrote: > > > >>> I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit. > >> > >> My terms are: > >> > >> Super-Personal Intentional (Intuition) > >> | > >> | > >> | > >> unintentional (determinism) ------------+-------------- unintentional > >> (random) > >> | > >> | > >> | > >> Sub-Personal Intentional (Instinct) > >> > >> > >> + = Free will = Personal Intentional (Voluntary Preference) > >> The x axis = Impersonal > > I don't think these are definitions, they are arguments. A definition > > of "intentional" in the common sense does not normally include > > "neither determined nor random". You should start with the normal > > definition then show that it could be neither determined nor random. > > It is a serious problem in a debate if someone surreptitiously puts > > their conclusion into the definition of the terms. > > As a diagram of different action it implies there are, in each quadrant, > actions that are > both "Intentional" and "unintentional". As I said there's no point in > arguing with someone > who contradicts himself. >
All actions that we take are both intentional and unintentional to different degrees. Obviously. We can have a instinct which is highly intentional but influenced by physiological conditions which are unintentional. We can have a personal preference which is intentional but rooted in an arbitrary whim. Human intention is a multilayered, multi-level quality, not a binary distinction. Craig > > Brent > > > > >>>>> So, do you believe that it possible that an entity which is > >>>>> deterministic from a third person perspective could be conscious, or > >>>>> do you believe that an entity which is deterministic from a third > >>>>> person perspective could not possibly be conscious? > >>>> > >>>> Yes, I think all deterministic looking systems represent > sensory-motor > >>>> participation of some kind, but not necessarily on the level that we > >>>> assume. > >>>> What we see as a cloud may have sensory-motor participation as > droplets > >>>> of > >>>> water molecules, and as a wisp in the atmosphere as a whole, but not > at > >>>> all > >>>> as a coherent cloud that we perceive. The cloud is a human scale > emblem, > >>>> not > >>>> the native entity. The native awareness may reside in a much faster > or > >>>> much > >>>> slower frequency range or sample rate than our own, so there is > little > >>>> hope > >>>> of our relating to it personally. It's like Flatland only with > >>>> perceptual > >>>> relativity rather than quant dimension. > >>> I'm not completely sure but I think you've just said the brain could > >>> be deterministic and still be conscious. > >> > >> What looks deterministic is not conscious, but what is consciousness > can > >> have be represented publicly by activity which looks deterministic to > us. > >> Nothing is actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual. > > If something conscious can look deterministic in every empirical test > > then that's as good as saying that the brain could be deterministic. A > > computer is deterministic in every empirical test but you could also > > say without fear of contradiction that it is "not actually, cosmically > > deterministic, only habitual." > > > >>>> This is also why computers are not conscious. The native entity is > >>>> microelectronic or geological, not mechanical. The machine as a whole > is > >>>> again an emblem, not an organic, self-invested whole. > >>> I don't understand what you think the fundamental difference is > >>> between a brain, a cloud and a computer. > >> > >> A brain is part of an animal's body, which is the public representation > of > >> an animal's lifetime. It is composed of cells which are the public > >> representation of microbiological experiences. > >> > >> A cloud is part of an atmosphere, which is the public representation of > some > >> scale of experience - could be geological, galactic, molecular...who > knows. > >> > >> A computer is an assembly of objects being employed by a foreign agency > for > >> its own motives. The objects each have their own history and nature, so > that > >> they relate to each other on a very limited and lowest common > denominator > >> range of coherence. It is a room full or blind people who don't speak > the > >> same language, jostling each other around rhythmically because that's > all > >> they can do. > >> > >> The brain and body are a four billion year old highly integrated > >> civilization with thousands of specific common histories. The cloud is > more > >> like farmland, passively cycling through organic phases. > > I don't see the relevance of history here. How would it make any > > difference to me if the atoms in my body were put there yesterday by a > > fantastically improbably whirlwind? I'd still feel basically the same, > > though I might have some issues if I learned of my true origin. > > > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
