On Tuesday, March 19, 2013 7:14:14 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: > > On 3/19/2013 3:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg > > <whats...@gmail.com<javascript:>> > wrote: > > > >>> I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit. > >> > >> My terms are: > >> > >> Super-Personal Intentional (Intuition) > >> | > >> | > >> | > >> unintentional (determinism) ------------+-------------- unintentional > >> (random) > >> | > >> | > >> | > >> Sub-Personal Intentional (Instinct) > >> > >> > >> + = Free will = Personal Intentional (Voluntary Preference) > >> The x axis = Impersonal > > I don't think these are definitions, they are arguments. A definition > > of "intentional" in the common sense does not normally include > > "neither determined nor random". You should start with the normal > > definition then show that it could be neither determined nor random. > > It is a serious problem in a debate if someone surreptitiously puts > > their conclusion into the definition of the terms. > > As a diagram of different action it implies there are, in each quadrant, > actions that are > both "Intentional" and "unintentional". As I said there's no point in > arguing with someone > who contradicts himself. >
All actions that we take are both intentional and unintentional to different degrees. Obviously. We can have a instinct which is highly intentional but influenced by physiological conditions which are unintentional. We can have a personal preference which is intentional but rooted in an arbitrary whim. Human intention is a multilayered, multi-level quality, not a binary distinction. Craig > > Brent > > > > >>>>> So, do you believe that it possible that an entity which is > >>>>> deterministic from a third person perspective could be conscious, or > >>>>> do you believe that an entity which is deterministic from a third > >>>>> person perspective could not possibly be conscious? > >>>> > >>>> Yes, I think all deterministic looking systems represent > sensory-motor > >>>> participation of some kind, but not necessarily on the level that we > >>>> assume. > >>>> What we see as a cloud may have sensory-motor participation as > droplets > >>>> of > >>>> water molecules, and as a wisp in the atmosphere as a whole, but not > at > >>>> all > >>>> as a coherent cloud that we perceive. The cloud is a human scale > emblem, > >>>> not > >>>> the native entity. The native awareness may reside in a much faster > or > >>>> much > >>>> slower frequency range or sample rate than our own, so there is > little > >>>> hope > >>>> of our relating to it personally. It's like Flatland only with > >>>> perceptual > >>>> relativity rather than quant dimension. > >>> I'm not completely sure but I think you've just said the brain could > >>> be deterministic and still be conscious. > >> > >> What looks deterministic is not conscious, but what is consciousness > can > >> have be represented publicly by activity which looks deterministic to > us. > >> Nothing is actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual. > > If something conscious can look deterministic in every empirical test > > then that's as good as saying that the brain could be deterministic. A > > computer is deterministic in every empirical test but you could also > > say without fear of contradiction that it is "not actually, cosmically > > deterministic, only habitual." > > > >>>> This is also why computers are not conscious. The native entity is > >>>> microelectronic or geological, not mechanical. The machine as a whole > is > >>>> again an emblem, not an organic, self-invested whole. > >>> I don't understand what you think the fundamental difference is > >>> between a brain, a cloud and a computer. > >> > >> A brain is part of an animal's body, which is the public representation > of > >> an animal's lifetime. It is composed of cells which are the public > >> representation of microbiological experiences. > >> > >> A cloud is part of an atmosphere, which is the public representation of > some > >> scale of experience - could be geological, galactic, molecular...who > knows. > >> > >> A computer is an assembly of objects being employed by a foreign agency > for > >> its own motives. The objects each have their own history and nature, so > that > >> they relate to each other on a very limited and lowest common > denominator > >> range of coherence. It is a room full or blind people who don't speak > the > >> same language, jostling each other around rhythmically because that's > all > >> they can do. > >> > >> The brain and body are a four billion year old highly integrated > >> civilization with thousands of specific common histories. The cloud is > more > >> like farmland, passively cycling through organic phases. > > I don't see the relevance of history here. How would it make any > > difference to me if the atoms in my body were put there yesterday by a > > fantastically improbably whirlwind? I'd still feel basically the same, > > though I might have some issues if I learned of my true origin. > > > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
