Looking forward to the second part. The first part is rather empty. Richard
On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 7:21 PM, Ian Mclean <[email protected]> wrote: > Details on my blog, Radical > Computing<http://radicomp.blogspot.com/2013/08/proof-of-impossibility-sketch-for.html> > . > > The summary is this, we can argue that a Theory of Everything is > characterized by either syntactic, negation, or deductive completeness or > universal closure. "A *theory of everything* (*ToE*) or *final theory* is > a theory of theoretical physics that fully explains and links together > all known physical phenomena, and predicts the outcome of *any* experiment > that could be carried out *in principle*." (Wikipedia: Theory of > Everything <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_everything>) Either > definition excludes strictly consistent theories from consideration. > Universal closure is achieved almost exclusively by the axiom of > unrestricted comprehension and universal sets which in general entail > Russell's paradox. Completeness is a more tractable property, but as I've > sketched, necessitates that a neither a Theory of Everything nor its > metasystem is strictly consistent. > > This sketch is for the first part of a two part thesis on proof by > contradiction methods examining proofs by contradiction intolerance and > proofs by contradiction tolerance towards the development of paraconsistent > metasystems and methods in metamathematics and the scientific method. > Rather than argue for the impossibility of a theory of everything > whatsoever, I argue that this necessitates that a Theory of Everything and > its metasystem will be paraconsistent in a stronger sense than Zizzi's Lq > and Lnq qubit languages. The second part of the paper will re-examine > Gödel's proofs, Russell's paradox, and diagonalization proofs with > contradiction tolerant methods. > > I appreciate any feedback--especially constructive criticism, > -Ian D.L.N. Mclean > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
