Details on my blog, Radical 

The summary is this, we can argue that a Theory of Everything is 
characterized by either syntactic, negation, or deductive completeness or 
universal closure. "A *theory of everything* (*ToE*) or *final theory* is 
atheory of theoretical physics that 
fully explains and links together all known physical phenomena, and 
predicts the outcome of *any* experiment that could be carried out *in 
principle*." (Wikipedia: Theory of 
) Either definition excludes strictly consistent theories from 
consideration. Universal closure is achieved almost exclusively by the 
axiom of unrestricted comprehension and universal sets which in general 
entail Russell's paradox. Completeness is a more tractable property, but as 
I've sketched, necessitates that a neither a Theory of Everything nor its 
metasystem is strictly consistent.

This sketch is for the first part of a two part thesis on proof by 
contradiction methods examining proofs by contradiction intolerance and 
proofs by contradiction tolerance towards the development of paraconsistent 
metasystems and methods in metamathematics and the scientific method. 
Rather than argue for the impossibility of a theory of everything 
whatsoever, I argue that this necessitates that a Theory of Everything and 
its metasystem will be paraconsistent in a stronger sense than Zizzi's Lq 
and Lnq qubit languages. The second part of the paper will re-examine 
Gödel's proofs, Russell's paradox, and diagonalization proofs with 
contradiction tolerant methods.

I appreciate any feedback--especially constructive criticism,
-Ian D.L.N. Mclean

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