Details on my blog, Radical
The summary is this, we can argue that a Theory of Everything is
characterized by either syntactic, negation, or deductive completeness or
universal closure. "A *theory of everything* (*ToE*) or *final theory* is
atheory of theoretical physics that
fully explains and links together all known physical phenomena, and
predicts the outcome of *any* experiment that could be carried out *in
principle*." (Wikipedia: Theory of
) Either definition excludes strictly consistent theories from
consideration. Universal closure is achieved almost exclusively by the
axiom of unrestricted comprehension and universal sets which in general
entail Russell's paradox. Completeness is a more tractable property, but as
I've sketched, necessitates that a neither a Theory of Everything nor its
metasystem is strictly consistent.
This sketch is for the first part of a two part thesis on proof by
contradiction methods examining proofs by contradiction intolerance and
proofs by contradiction tolerance towards the development of paraconsistent
metasystems and methods in metamathematics and the scientific method.
Rather than argue for the impossibility of a theory of everything
whatsoever, I argue that this necessitates that a Theory of Everything and
its metasystem will be paraconsistent in a stronger sense than Zizzi's Lq
and Lnq qubit languages. The second part of the paper will re-examine
Gödel's proofs, Russell's paradox, and diagonalization proofs with
contradiction tolerant methods.
I appreciate any feedback--especially constructive criticism,
-Ian D.L.N. Mclean
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