And where you say:

Any way, I don't defend comp, I just show that comp makes physics   
derivable in arithmetic, and that if you do it in some way, (using the   
logic of self-reference) you can extract a general theory of qualia,   
with its quanta part that you can compare with nature, and so test   
comp. And up to now, it fits well with the facts. 

What the hell are you talking about? I don't mean to be John Clark rude, but
honestly, I can't see at all how qualia can possibly emerge from your 

Cheers, and still looking for "the answer", 


On Saturday, October 12, 2013 1:33:10 AM UTC-4, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
> Sorry to resurrect such an old thread, but I think I'd like to respond 
> here: 
> On Saturday, November 10, 2012 4:32:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 10 Nov 2012, at 10:11, freqflyer07281972 wrote: 
>> > Hey all on the list, 
>> > 
>> > Bruno, I must say, thinking of the UDA. The key assumption is this   
>> > teleportation business, and wouldn't it really be quite Ockham's   
>> > Razorish to simply conclude from the entire argument that the   
>> > correct substitution level is, in principle, not only not knowable,   
>> > but not achievable, which means: 
>> > 
>> > congratulations, you have found a convincing thought experiment   
>> > proof that teleportation is impossible in any cases greater than,   
>> > say, 12 atoms or so (give me a margin of error of about plus/minus   
>> > 100) ... 
>> No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions:  (MAT is weak   
>> materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical reality) 
>> COMP   -> NOT MAT 
>> I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really MAT   
>> means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a weirdness   
>> close to quantum Everett. 
>> > this is very reminiscent of the way that time travel theorists use   
>> > some of godel's closed timelike curve (CTC) solutions to einstein's   
>> > relativity to argue that time travel to the past is possible. The   
>> > problem is, the furthest back you can go is when you made the CTC,   
>> > and yet in order to make the CTC, the formal and physical conditions   
>> > require that you already have to have a time machine. This, of   
>> > course, leads to paradox, because in order to travel in the time   
>> > machine in the first place, you have to have had a time machine to   
>> > use as a kind of mechanism for the whole project. 
>> But such loop can exist consistently in solution of the GR equation.   
>> that's what Gödel showed. I don't think this was really a problem for   
>> Einstein, as he said more than once, that time is an illusion. We   
>> would say now that it is a machine mental construction, which obeys   
>> the laws of machines. 
>> But here we have the essence of the problem, I think. Simply because the 
> mathematics or the logics of a given 
> problem happens to state that something CAN occur, this is absolutely no 
> imposition upon nature that such things
> MUST occur... we find certain things in mathematics that may or may not 
> correspond to reality. It is truly uncanny in the 
> ways that mathematics does correspond, absolutely no doubt or argument. 
> But what of all that stuff where 
> the math simply has nothing to say? How can you possibly derive qualia 
> from math without a bunch of basic 
> handwaving -- which is really what you are doing when you cite such 
> arguments as Bp & p.... etc etc.... it is 
> really a lot of handwaving nonsense that never gets close to the issue at 
> all...
> I really love the idea of your theory of everything Bruno, I really do, 
> but when it comes to my next meal, or what I need to do with my 
> life, or what my next big decision is going to be, this is of no help. 
> BTW, if it's of any console, Craig's theory of everything doesn't help me 
> in the 
> same basic ways, so there... the thing is... all this stuff is about 
> abstraction, and yet life as lived is anything but abstraction...
> all particularities matter, at every level, shouldn't a theory of 
> everything really be a theory of particularities and contingencies, as they 
> have been produced?
> and not a theory of general particularities that no one is really 
> concerned about? 
> cheers,
> Dan 
>> > 
>> > In the same way, I think, does your ingenious UDA lead not to the   
>> > conclusion you want it to, (i.e. we are eternal numbers contained in   
>> > the computation of some infinite computer) but rather the less   
>> > appealing conclusion that, perhaps, the teleportation required in   
>> > your entire thought experiment is simply impossible, for much of the   
>> > same reasons as time travel is impossible. 
>> But then we cannot be even quantum computer, because they can emulate   
>> by a classical machine, and they too exist in the arithmetical realm. 
>> Any way, I don't defend comp, I just show that comp makes physics   
>> derivable in arithmetic, and that if you do it in some way, (using the   
>> logic of self-reference) you can extract a general theory of qualia,   
>> with its quanta part that you can compare with nature, and so test   
>> comp. And up to now, it fits well with the facts. 
>> > 
>> > It's still an important result, but perhaps not as profound as you   
>> > think if we admit that the teleportation required in your thought   
>> > experiment is simply not possibly for purely naturalistic (and   
>> > therefore not computational, or mechanistic) reasons. 
>> But the you need to assume non comp. The non clonability is also easy   
>> to derive from comp, as the matter which constitutes us is eventually   
>> defined by the entire, non computable dovetaling. 
>> But puuting the subst level so low that comp is false, force you to   
>> use a strong form of non comp, where matter is not just infinite, but   
>> have to be a very special infinite not recoverable in the limiting   
>> first person indeterminacy. What you do is a bit like introducing an a   
>> priori unintelligible notion of matter to just avoid the consequence   
>> of a theory. Bilogy and its extreme redundancy and metabolic exchange   
>> pleas for comp, as such redundancy and metabolisation would be   
>> miraculous if not comp emulable. In fact we don't know in nature any   
>> process not emulable by a computer, except for the consciousness   
>> selection, like in the WM duplication, or in quantum everett. 
>> You are logically right, but abandoning comp is premature, before   
>> listening to the machine (AUDA). 
>> I know that some aristotelians are ready for all means, to avoid the   
>> neoplatonist consequences, but that is normal given the 1500 years of   
>> authoritative arguments. 
>> Bruno 

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