On 12 Oct 2013, at 07:33, freqflyer07281972 wrote:

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Sorry to resurrect such an old thread, but I think I'd like torespond here:On Saturday, November 10, 2012 4:32:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Nov 2012, at 10:11, freqflyer07281972 wrote: > Hey all on the list, > > Bruno, I must say, thinking of the UDA. The key assumption is this > teleportation business, and wouldn't it really be quite Ockham's > Razorish to simply conclude from the entire argument that the > correct substitution level is, in principle, not only not knowable, > but not achievable, which means: > > congratulations, you have found a convincing thought experiment > proof that teleportation is impossible in any cases greater than, > say, 12 atoms or so (give me a margin of error of about plus/minus > 100) ... No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions: (MAT is weak materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical reality) COMP -> NOT MAT MAT -> NOT COMP NOT MAT or NOT COMP I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really MAT means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a weirdness close to quantum Everett. > this is very reminiscent of the way that time travel theorists use > some of godel's closed timelike curve (CTC) solutions to einstein's > relativity to argue that time travel to the past is possible. The > problem is, the furthest back you can go is when you made the CTC, > and yet in order to make the CTC, the formal and physical conditions > require that you already have to have a time machine. This, of > course, leads to paradox, because in order to travel in the time > machine in the first place, you have to have had a time machine to > use as a kind of mechanism for the whole project. But such loop can exist consistently in solution of the GR equation. that's what GĂ¶del showed. I don't think this was really a problem for Einstein, as he said more than once, that time is an illusion. We would say now that it is a machine mental construction, which obeys the laws of machines.But here we have the essence of the problem, I think. Simply becausethe mathematics or the logics of a givenproblem happens to state that something CAN occur, this isabsolutely no imposition upon nature that such thingsMUST occur... we find certain things in mathematics that may or maynot correspond to reality.

Which reality? What are your assumptions?

`To give sense to the word "comp" (and Church thesis), we must agree`

`that the artithmetical propositions are true or not independently of us.`

`In particular, the statement "freqflyer07281972 believes that he has`

`sent a post to the everything list on the 12 october 2013" is`

`(amazingly enough) provable in arithmetic (modulo acceptable`

`definition, acceptable in the comp theory, to be sure).`

`(Now the real consciousness of freqflyer07281972 does not only depends`

`on that proposition, but on all proofs (in the mathematical sense)`

`which exist in arithmetic).`

`It is the very basic idea defended in the everything list that`

`everything consistent exist. Comp forces us to extend Everett`

`multiplication of worlds into a multiplication of dreams (and nothing`

`else is real, in that theory).`

It is truly uncanny in theways that mathematics does correspond, absolutely no doubt orargument. But what of all that stuff wherethe math simply has nothing to say?

Some mathematical truth are beyond the saying of some machines.

How can you possibly derive qualia from math without a bunch of basichandwaving -- which is really what you are doing when you cite sucharguments as Bp & p.... etc etc.... it isreally a lot of handwaving nonsense that never gets close to theissue at all...

`You are a bit quick here. Are you sure you grasp the math and the`

`notion involved?`

The Bp & p idea occurred to Theaetetus, and in many Indians analyses.

`If you have some better definition, capable of formalizing the antic`

`dream argument for doubting reality, I might appreciate.`

`If not, it looks like saying qualia are not mathematically`

`representable (which is true) and thus cannot be mathematically`

`explained (which does not follow, as the Bp & p can be proved to be`

`non mathematically representable too by the machine to which it`

`applies, and there are many examples of this, notably appearing when`

`machines looks at themselves.`

`Note that even if comp is false, the hypostases describe real self-`

`referential discourse by machines, existing in arithmetic. It makes`

`your point being like saying, "oh, but those are only machine, and`

`thus are zombies".`

I really love the idea of your theory of everything Bruno, I reallydo, but when it comes to my next meal, or what I need to do with mylife, or what my next big decision is going to be, this is of no help.

`All right. The idea is to contemplate possible truth. It is not`

`necessarily practical.`

`Yet, I do think comp has a (meta) practical role: to remind us our`

`ignorance, especially in theology. To illustrate that we can do`

`theology scientifically, and that we are abyssally ignorant. We can`

`use comp to just measure how big that ignorance is. It might help`

`human to harbor less certainties on those issues, and that could be`

`good, as those certainties are the roots of much of the human suffering.`

`Comp explains that the correct machine are universal dissident. Like I`

`explained to John Mike, and Craig, comp is a quasi universal vaccine`

`against the reduction or elimination of the person.`

BTW, if it's of any console, Craig's theory of everything doesn'thelp me in thesame basic ways, so there... the thing is... all this stuff is aboutabstraction, and yet life as lived is anything but abstraction...all particularities matter, at every level, shouldn't a theory ofeverything really be a theory of particularities and contingencies,as they have been produced?and not a theory of general particularities that no one is reallyconcerned about?

It is the same. Pure math get applied all the time.

`Also, computationalism is fundamentally very concrete: as it is a`

`question of life and death when dying and in front of accepting an`

`artificial brain. And then my point is that if we can survive such`

`substitution, then reality might be like Plato and the mystics said,`

`and unlike Aristotle and the naturalists pretend. (I fight against all`

`dogma).`

`Understanding this can be life changing, if only because it introduce`

`new fears, like afterlife.`

`You can also smoke salvia, which sums pretty well the dream-argument`

`and enlarges it in a life changing way.`

`It does it in less than 8 minutes, which is much shorter than a life`

`of study of computer science.`

That plant is stealing my job somehow! Fortunately it becomes illegal, so comp keeps its role :) (Well ... as long as comp is not illegal ...) Best, thanks for the kind words, Bruno

cheers, Dan > > In the same way, I think, does your ingenious UDA lead not to the > conclusion you want it to, (i.e. we are eternal numbers contained in > the computation of some infinite computer) but rather the less > appealing conclusion that, perhaps, the teleportation required in > your entire thought experiment is simply impossible, for much of the > same reasons as time travel is impossible. But then we cannot be even quantum computer, because they can emulate by a classical machine, and they too exist in the arithmetical realm. Any way, I don't defend comp, I just show that comp makes physics derivable in arithmetic, and that if you do it in some way, (using the logic of self-reference) you can extract a general theory of qualia, with its quanta part that you can compare with nature, and so test comp. And up to now, it fits well with the facts. > > It's still an important result, but perhaps not as profound as you > think if we admit that the teleportation required in your thought > experiment is simply not possibly for purely naturalistic (and > therefore not computational, or mechanistic) reasons. But the you need to assume non comp. The non clonability is also easy to derive from comp, as the matter which constitutes us is eventually defined by the entire, non computable dovetaling. But puuting the subst level so low that comp is false, force you to use a strong form of non comp, where matter is not just infinite, but have to be a very special infinite not recoverable in the limiting first person indeterminacy. What you do is a bit like introducing an a priori unintelligible notion of matter to just avoid the consequence of a theory. Bilogy and its extreme redundancy and metabolic exchange pleas for comp, as such redundancy and metabolisation would be miraculous if not comp emulable. In fact we don't know in nature any process not emulable by a computer, except for the consciousness selection, like in the WM duplication, or in quantum everett. You are logically right, but abandoning comp is premature, before listening to the machine (AUDA). I know that some aristotelians are ready for all means, to avoid the neoplatonist consequences, but that is normal given the 1500 years of authoritative arguments. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

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