On Sunday, October 13, 2013 11:26:49 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 13 Oct 2013, at 15:20, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Sunday, October 13, 2013 6:04:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 13 Oct 2013, at 08:35, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> Maybe this will help. Here are two criticisms of comp, and two hypotheses >> which aim for a more mathematical treatment of PIP principles under MSR. >> * >> Presumption of repeatability* (PR) - By overlooking the possibility of >> absolute uniqueness, >> >> >> ? >> 0, s(0), ... are unique. >> > > By absolute uniqueness I mean that something could be utterly > inconceivable before its appearance, and unrepeatable in any way > thereafter. Numbers cannot be created from scratch, they can only be > recycled from the pool of combinatory possiblities. To be unique is to be > immune from precedent or repetition - inherently non-emulable by definition. > > > Like the first person experience of here and now. That is non repeatable, > as it supervenes on *all* its 3p repetition. > So, thanks to comp and the FPI, I can make sense of what you say. But that > is first person experience only. >
An interesting point. I would say that first person experience of here and now supervenes on all of its 3p repetition but it also supervenes on the masking of all 3p repetition. As private persons, we are latecomers to the universe so for us, we have many sub-personal and super-personal experiences which we have joined 'already in progress' as it were. When we add a new moment to our experience, we are continuing the weaving of these sub and super personal stories (through their insistence as sub-personal urges and super-personal coincidences/intuitions I might add), but we are also pushing our own personal agenda outward. The sum of all outward pushing is what the sum of all 3p originally supervenes on. The 3p impersonal is the dry husk of the alienated past, and the compost for the 1p future, but all 3p is only a reflection of all 1p (well, just p at that point, since the 1p-3p distinction is a reflection of the underlying p reflector/Reflektor http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7E0fVfectDo). > > > > >> >> comp must conceive of all events as locally documented stereotypes of a >> Platonic template rather than true originals. >> >> >> "true original" is too much fuzzy. >> > > I think it could not be more clear? An original which has no possible > precedent. The number one would be a true original, but all other integers > represent multiple copies of one. All rational numbers are partial copies > of one. All prime numbers are still divisible by one, so not truly prime. A > true original must be indivisible and unrepeatable, i.e. one can never be > 'new' again, but the novelty. > > > OK, OK. In comp, it is probably given by the experiences themselves. Even > in a rotating Gödelian universe with cylclic time, the first person > experience don't repeat. > Cool. > > > > The first variable (lets call Alpha-X) is original, but all other > variables duplicate the idea of Alpha-X (yellow is an idea which cannot be > duplicated or divided). What I am trying to say is that to access awareness > mathematically I suggest that we would have to begin with the opposite of > cardinality rather than cardinality. Each moment is neither repeatable nor > unrepeatable, quantifiable or unquantifiable. Transcardinality provides for > a leaky primitive, or primitive of self-modulating leakiness. It is not > digital or fluid, but intimations of waving and granularity are reflected > back as echoes. > > > No problem. To be short that what the machines explains when you listen to > them. > Are these machines that are correct or are they machines whose delusions you are saying match mine? > > > > > >> >> This contradicts our intuitions >> >> >> And? >> > > And deserves to be investigated. Our intuitions should, by default, be > treated as the most locally relevant branch of arithmetic truth. > > > We start from intutions, yes, but then we face the counter-intuitive, a > bit like we start from the self, but then meet the others. > So far so good, but I think that we must then face the meta-counter-intuitive and see that the difference between self-other and intuitive-counter-intuitive constitutes a dipole within a boundaryless continuum of sense. It's the dipole-ness that is the interesting part. Symmetry and juxtaposition. That is more primitive than arithmetic, but still not as primitive as the aesthetic appreciation/expectation of it. > > > >> >> >> >> about the proprietary nature of identity >> >> >> No, this is confirmed, nit contradicted. The first persons too are >> unique, and non divisible, necessarily so from their perspective. >> > > If you believe in comp maybe. > > > Believing in the classical theory of knowledge is enough. > > Classical logic + > Kp -> p > K(p->q) -> (Kp -> Kq) > + (for reflexive enough machine) Kp -> KKp > > When Kp is defined by Bp & p (Theaetetus in arithmetic) we get such a > theory (extended by the knowledge version of Löb's formula, the Grzegorczyk > formula B(B(p->Bp)->p)->p. It entails an abstract asymmetry. > It sounds interesting but I seem to be allergic to variables. I think that logic lacks grounding. I don't think that belief or propositions can exist outside of sensory experience. > > > > > That assumes that numbers can conjure non-numerical results. > > > No. Comp assumes that. But arithmetic confirms. Beliefs predicate obeys > modal laws. > How does arithmetic conceive of non-numbers? > > > > There is nothing that I can see that supports the idea that computation > can generate new ontologies. > > > That is not an argument for saying there are none. > It seems absurd, like saying x+y='the smell of coffee', but I can suspend disbelief (and I have before). The problem that I run into then, is why doesn't any experience with computation seem to corroborate the idea that computations can come with their own qualia? If I play an mp3 on a computer, and listen to it in headphones at the same time that I watch a WinAmp vis of it as a sinewave, what kind of qualia does the actual processing of the mp3 have? > > > > >> >> >> >> and would seem to counterfactually predict a very low interest in >> qualities such as individuality and originality, >> >> >> Gratuitous opportunistic assertion. >> > > How so? Why would 1p experience value novelty if it is just an outcropping > of a machine that by definition can create only trivially 'new' > combinations of copies? > > > That is not the case. Machine looking inward, in the standard Gödel sense, > get creative, and and only more surprised when digging deeper. > What can be created other than more numbers though? > > > > 456098209093457976534 is different from 45609420909345797353, but why does > that difference seem insignificant to us, but the difference between a belt > worn by Elvis and a copy of that belt to be demonstrably significant to > many people. > > > Sure. > > > > >> >> >> and identification with trivial personal preferences. Of course, what we >> see the precise opposite, as all celebrity it propelled by some suggestion >> unrepeatability and the fine tuning of lifestyle choices is arguably the >> most prolific and successful feature of consumerism. >> >> >> That is not argument. Looks like propaganda to me. >> > > That's not a counter-argument. Looks like you're defensive to me. > > > Sure I am. I defend the right of my sun in law to get his steak. > He can get a virtual steak, and if Comp is true, that would be every bit as good. > > > > > > >> >> >> >> *Presumption of finite simplicities* - Because comp provides uniqueness >> only in the form of the relative scarcity of vastly complex numbers, it can >> be said to allow for the possibility of novelty only in one direction; that >> of more quantity. New qualities, by comp, must arise on the event horizons >> of the UD, >> >> >> Which is were we live here and now. >> > > That would be true under comp, sure. > > >> >> >> yet qualia inherently speaks in a language of rich simplicity instead of >> cumbersome computables. >> >> >> That is not an argument. >> > > No, it's a factual observation. The smell of oranges is rich and simple > without any experienced computation, > > > Of course, we cannot experience computations. We would need some sensor > nerves in the brain, but that is not the case. We experience happenings and > scenarios, in complex sheaf of computational histories. > Why would we not experience computations under Comp? What sensor could there be other than one which was also a program? In Comp land, I see no reason why a machine would not experience complex computational histories as quantitatively addressed 'sheafs'. Files. Variables. No qualia required. > > > > other than in connecting the smell with the rest of our associations with > oranges. > > >> >> >> >> With comp, there is no new 'one', but in reality, every human experience >> is exactly that. >> >> Hypothesis: >> >> *Diagonalization of the unique* - Because computation lags behind >> experience, no simulation of a brain can catch up to what a natural person >> *can be*, >> >> >> ? >> >> >> >> since the potential for their uniqueness is immeasurable and >> unprecedented. Also, nothing can be copied before it is unique, >> >> >> ? >> >> >> so PIP flips the presumption of repeatability (PR) so that all novelty >> exists as an absolutely new simplicity as well as a relatively new >> complexity, such that the continuum of novelty extends in both directions. >> >> The false dichotomy posed by comp in which we are forced to choose >> between the truth of Church-Turing and the existence of an infinitely low >> level of substitution for human personhood is exposed because under PIP, >> computation is a public repetition of what is irreducibly unrepeatable and >> private. Computation can never get ahead of experience, because computation >> is an a posteriori measurement of it. >> >> The computer model of what an athlete will do on the field that is based >> on their past performance will always fail to account for the possibility >> that the next performance will be the first time that athlete does >> something that they never have done before. Natural identities are not only >> self-diagonalizing, natural identity itself is self-diagonalization. The >> emergence of the unique always cheats prediction, since all prediction >> belongs to the measurements of an expired world which did not yet contain >> the next novelty. >> >> >> ? >> >> >> >> *Pushing UD* - My admittedly limited understanding of UDA gives me a >> picture of the UD as a program which pulls the experienced universe behind >> it as it extends the computed realm ahead of local appearances. It assumes >> a priori arithmetic truth which simply 'is' which produces the future from >> a fixed past. >> >> >> ? >> >> >> >> All phenomena are built bottom up from generic, interchangeable bits. The >> hypothesis under PIP is that awareness is pushing the UD, not being pulled >> by it. Each new number is the residue of an unprecedented experience as it >> decays from immeasurable private qualia into quantifiable public >> reflections. Every measure requires a ruler. Some example which is >> presented as an index for comparison. A "new Michael Jordan". A third world >> war. The uniqueness comes first, and the computability follows - fudging >> and filling as necessary, including ways which could be interpreted as >> supernatural (retrocausational discontinuities, mysterious lucky >> coincidences, etc). >> >> >> ? >> >> Hmm... >> >> You write too well, and that does not help you. It looks like bad >> politics. Your approach avoids the problems by deeming them as not solvable >> at any level. >> > > I don't deem them as unsolvable at any level, I understand why Comp's > assumption of solving them is based on a couple of bad assumptions - namely > > 1. the universality of recursion, > > > You mean Church thesis. This is a very solid hypothesis. > I mean the extension of Church to all phenomena, not just the measurable ones. > > > and > 2. complexity-driven novelty. > > > Hmm... > > > > > I propose solving them by reversing those two assumptions, so that > > 1. Recursion is assumed to be derived from primordial spontaneity > > > But primordial spontaneity are complex notion. > I don't think it is. > You explain the simple (learnable in high school) from the abstruse and > complex. You are the one driven by complexity here. > I give it a complex name to be precise, but what is being named could not be simpler. Whim. Impulse. > > > > rather than the other way around. > 2. Novelty perpetually re-asserts simplicity at the same time as it > expands complexity. > > > No problem with this, but again this is not a problem for a > computationalist. > > I haven't seen it proposed before. Are you saying that it has? > > > This makes > > 3. The expanding event horizon of the UD is an a posteriori documentation > into storage, not an active and fertile entropy attractor, which is a > priori to recording or measure. > > 4. Comp untrue by virtue of diagonalization of immeasurable novelty > against incompleteness. Sense out-incompletes arithmetic truth, and > therefore leaves it frozen in stasis by comparison in every instant, and in > eternity. Comp cannot animate anything except through the gullibility of > the pathetic fallacy. (Harsh words if taken personally, but I'm not trying > to provoke you Bruno, I'm trying to express the full import of this shift > in thinking. The future of human understanding depends, ultimately, on our > ability to graduate from the cul-de-sac of mechanisms to the more profound > truth of animisms. > > Think about it? > > > > I found a youtube video, and will try to research for it, a rather nice > explanation, by a robotist engineer, who was also also a naïve japanese > animist, of why animism implies comp. > > He was interviewed aside of one of its creation, a chatty woman-like > androids, and the journalist ask him if he was not afraid that the general > public might believe that such mechanical woman is truly thinking and > conscious. > > He answered that he was pleased by that reaction, and not astonished, > because, for the japanese, there is just no doubt that computers and robots > are conscious, because they already believe that all machine (including > doors and houses) are conscious, even pebble. > > If that comp is pathetic fallacy, then animism is even more pathetic. > Sure, naive animism would be more pathetic, but I am talking about a rehabilitated animism - pansensitivity. A calculator can appear as a character in my experience, and that can reflect the overall sense of my relation to the my own history and to eternity - so in that sense, the calculator can be treated -as if- it had its own contribution as a single subject, but only as it serves my narrative. Independently of my experience, the calculator has no single subject, it is billions of sub-sub-sub-subjects arranged in circuits that are unknowable to them. > > If you defend animism, then it is will seem two times more vexing for my > sun in law to be said not enjoying the steak. > > It is almost like saying anything can be conscious, except the (person > incarnated in the) computers. > Right, because there is no person incarnated in the computer. The computer is not a thing, it is a collection of things which have very primitive sense. The computer-ness is artificial, just as a puppet is really only cloth or plastic that has been shaped by us to resemble our expectations of a companion. Craig > > Bruno > > > > > Craig > > > >> This kills at the start all possibility of progressing. *all* your >> sentences needs a lot of clarification and justification. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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