On 14 Nov 2013, at 14:54, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi - Roger Clough

All current theories of mind are objective (materialist) since they do not include the first person singular.


This seems to be a nonsense to me. Mind, by definition bears on first person singular. Plotinus already saw the link between soul and the knower, which can be shown first personal.

What materialists ignore is that mechanism (which they use explicitly or implicitly) i incompatible with materialism (the belief in Primitive Matter).

I told you this before, Roger, computationalism forces us logically to move quite beyond Leibniz.




Consciousness or Mind is nonobjective or subjective, since it is the perceptions by the first person singular.

Of course. Nobody doubt that. The error is in the belief that the first person reality is one-one with some third person reality. This makes matter and mind link magical, and incoppatible with Mechanism (which is the oldest of all philosophies, imo).



Only Leibniz has a philosophy of mind (subjectivity).

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/

So we (all welcome) need to bring Leibniz out of the closet.

This would revolutionize neurophiolsophy.

You should make your point, and mention Leibniz in a footnote.

It is better to focus on the point, instead of history and person, which is another (anecdotical) topic.

Keep in mind, once and for all, that today, we (I mean those "machines" who are willing to think for two seconds) know that Materialism, by which I mean just the belief in Aristotelian primitive matter IS incompatible with Mechanism (or Rationalism, as Diderot put it).

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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