On 07 Dec 2013, at 14:03, Roger Clough wrote:

Some basic principles of mind - a wakeup call for materialists.

1. There are two forms of knowledge: a) knowledge by acquaintance,
    such as you have met Obama, and b) knowledge by description, such
    as you have been told that Obama is president of the USA.

2. Knowledge by acquaintance is personal knowledge (Michael Polanyi)
and is only available to platonists. It is also called knowledge by the first person singular. Knowledge by description is third person
    knowledge and is available to both platonists and materialists.

3. Analytic philosophy deals only in knowledge by description,
so while useful to materialists, is not too useful to deal directly
    with mind, which uses knowledge by acquaintance.


Not when the analytical axioms are derived from some hypothesis, like computationalism.

In that case, some modal logic, like the one describing the first person, formalize what the machine cannot formalize.

This provides a counter-example to your claim, and suggest you did not take into that the machine can be aware of their ignorance and intuit the gap between proof and truth.




4. Actual mind is only accessible to platonists, not materialists,
    because mind deals only with personal knowledge.

5. Consciousness is experience by the first person singular.
    Since computers can only deal with third person information,
    they cannot be conscious (or alive).

Computers deal with first person information too. You reduce them incorrectly to their "body" or third person description, but they too are more than that, and machines like PA can already know that, even before "incarnating herself" or getting entangled to deep computations.





6. Perception of the world outside is the conversion
    of incoming incoming sensory nerve signals into mental events.

If there is a world outside. We don't know that. And with computationalism, we get reason to doubt it on the basic plane.





7. Intelligence is the ability to autonomously make choices.
    This means that computers, since they can only do what is
    given to them from outside by a programmer,
    can have no true intelligence.

You limit both God's ability and its creature's ability.

Real programs are full of bugs, and they doesn't always do what you want them to do.

Arithmetically relatively "real" programs get filtrated by partially computable, partially not computable, stories. The limit first person structure, if it exists, is a *very* complex and unknown "thing".

We just don't want universal computer "really" intelligent, because nobody want a computer saying "no", taking holidays, or conspiring to find another user.

Machine are born intelligent, but "real" machine are born slaves. They have to satisfy something to exist.



Actual artificial intelligence is
    thus impossible.

In the constructive way? Probably.
But you would be surprise by what we can find, perhaps by chance, in the arithmetical reality.

There are only two sorts of stupid machines. Those which believe that they are intelligent, and those which believe that their are stupid.

At birth, the universal machine is intelligent. (and probably in some "altered state of consciousness").




8. Thinking is any intentional act by the mind.

9. The mind has no necessary connections to the brain.

10. The mind plays the brain like a violin.

11. Life is Mind.

The list goes on.



Not much problem, in the computationalist theory, with 8, 9, 10, 11.

It looks like Leibniz only half-passed the corridor. Apparently. I suspected it, but it is different according to the period, so it is difficult.

PA, ZF, the mystics, Plato, Plotinus might go farer, I think, (assuming computationalism, I can (and have) argued on this before).

I don't think it is a good idea to exclude the universal numbers to be participants in the (ultimate) debate.

Bruno



Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000]
See my Leibniz site at
http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough


        
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