On 28 Dec 2013, at 02:03, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

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Jason,You state "The UD is a comparatively short program, and provablycontains the program that is identical to your mind."You can't be serious! As stated that's the most ridiculous statementI've heard here today in all manner of respects!

`If you believe this, you cannot believe in computationalism. If your`

`brain work is Turing emulable, that emulation is provably in`

`arithmetic, which emulates all (it is a theorem in arithmetic) all`

`computations. It is long to prove, but not so much difficult if you`

`add some axioms like the exponentiation axioms. It is a hell of a`

`difficulty to eliminate that exponentiation axioms, but that has been`

`done, even in some strong way (eliminating universal quantifiers`

`altogether) by Matiyasevitch, and that is well known (by logicians).`

`That the UD itself exist is a consequence of Church thesis, and is`

`obvious to many for wrong reason. If you know Cnator diagonalization,`

`then at first sight, it looks we can diagonalized against the UD`

`existence, but it happens that the UD and arithmetic is close for the`

`diagonalization procedure, making the UD, or equivalently the sigma_1`

`part of arithmetic, complete for the computational reality (of course`

`not complete for truth: that never happens by incompleteness à-la`

`Gödel).`

Bruno

Edgar On Friday, December 27, 2013 7:56:44 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 6:33 PM, Stephen Paul King<step...@provensecure.com> wrote:Dear Jason, Interleaving below.On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 6:20 PM, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com>wrote:On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 6:03 PM, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:On 28 December 2013 11:55, Stephen Paul King<step...@provensecure.com> wrote:Hi LizR,That is what is not explicitly explained! I could see how onemight make an argument based on Godel numbers and a choice of anumbering scheme could show the existence of a string of numbersthat, if run on some computer, would generate a description of theinteraction of several actors. But this ignores the problems ofconcurrency and "point of view". The best one might be able to do,AFAIK, is cook up a description of the interactions of many"observers" -each one is an intersection of infinitely manycomputations, but such a description would itself be the content ofsome observer's point of view that assumes a choice of Godelnumbering scheme.Something doesn't seem right about this!It seems to suggest "multi-solipsism" or something along those lines- which doesn't make it wrong, of course.I await Bruno's answer with interest. I think he has already saidsomething about this, but I don't recall it being satisfactory, atleast to my limited understanding.I am also interested to hear what Bruno has to say. My perspectiveis that most of the computations that support you and I are notisolated and short-lived "computational Boltzmann brains" but muchlarger, long-running computations such as those that correspond to auniverse in which life adapts and evolves.I agree. I have never been happy with the Boltzman brain argumentbecause it seems to assume that the probability distribution of"spontaneous" BBs is independent of the complexity of the content ofthe minds associated with those brains. I have been studying thisrelationship between complexity or "expressiveness" of a B.B. Myfirst guesstimation is that there is something like a Zift's Law inthe distribution: the more expressive a BB the less chance it has toexist and evolve at least one "cycle" of its computation. (Afterall, computers have to be able to run one clock cycle to be saidthat they actually "compute" some program...)The starting conditions for these is much less constrained, andtherefore it is far more probable to result in consciouscomputations such as ours than the case where the computationsupporting your brain experiencing this moment is some initialcondition of a very specific program. Certainly, those programsexist too, but they are much rarer.RIght, but how fast do they get rarer?It's hard to say. We would have to develop some model for estimatingthe Kolmogorov complexity (and maybe also incorporate frequency) ofdifferent programs and their relation to a given mind.They appear in the UD much less frequently than say the programcorresponding to the approximate laws of physics of this universe.It takes far more data to describe your brain than it does todescribe the physical system on which it is based.How do you estimate this?The UDA is a comparatively short program, and provably contains theprogram that is identical to your mind. Similarly, all of the knownlaws of physics could fit on a couple sheets of paper. QM seems tosuggest that all possible solutions to certain equations exist, andso there is no need to specify the initial conditions of theuniverse (which would require much more information to describe thanyour brain).Are you assuming that a lot of data can be compressed usingsymmetries and redundancies. This looks like a Kolmogorov complexity/entropy...Somewhat. I think how frequently a program is referenced /instantiated by other non-halting programs may play a role.So we are (mostly) still "in the same universe", and so we caninteract with and affect the consciousness of other people.From my reasoning, the appearance that we are "in the same universe"is a by product of bisimilarities in the infinity of computationsthat are each of us. In other words, there are many computationsthat are running Stephen that are identical to and thus are the samecomputation to many of the computations that are running Jason.Yes. We would be programs instantiated within a (possibly but notnecessarily) shared, larger program.This gives an overlap between our worlds and thus the appearanceof a common world for some collection of "observers".Right.The cool thing is that this implies that there are underlaps;computations that are not shared or bisimilar between all of us.Yes, I agree. In some branches of the MW, perhaps you were born butI was not, or I was, and you weren't.COuld those be the ones that we identify as "ourselves"?Personal identity can become a very difficult subject, since theremay be paths through which my program evolves to become you, andvice versa.Jason --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. 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