On Sunday, January 12, 2014 10:51:37 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 12 Jan 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > Here then is simpler and more familiar example of how computation > > can differ from natural understanding which is not susceptible to > > any mereological Systems argument. > > > > If any of you have use passwords which are based on a pattern of > > keystrokes rather than the letters on the keys, you know that you > > can enter your password every day without ever knowing what it is > > you are typing (something with a #r5f^ in it…?). > > > > I think this is a good analogy for machine intelligence. By storing > > and copying procedures, a pseudo-semantic analysis can be performed, > > but it is an instrumental logic that has no way to access the > > letters of the ‘human keyboard’. The universal machine’s keyboard is > > blank and consists only of theoretical x,y coordinates where keys > > would be. No matter how good or sophisticated the machine is, it > > will still have no way to understand what the particular keystrokes > > "mean" to a person, only how they fit in with whatever set of fixed > > possibilities has been defined. > > > You confuse level of description.
I think that the existence of a level of description invalidates comp. > What you say does not distinguish an > organic brain from a silicon one. Sure, but we to give the organic brain the benefit of the doubt of association with consciousness. Since silicon does not naturally seek to organize itself as a brain, we should doubt that it is associated with human consciousness by default. > The understanding is not done by the > computation in the brain, but by the person having some role in some > history, and only manifest itself through some computations (assuming > comp). > I don't see that computations can manifest anything by themselves though. > > > > > Taking the analogy further, the human keyboard only applies to > > public communication. Privately, we have no keys to strike, and > > entire paragraphs or books can be represented by a single thought. > > Unlike computers, we do not have to build our ideas up from > > syntactic digits. > > > It is the same for computers, once they have developed some relative > history. This is well modeled by the "& p" part of the definition of > knowing, and the math confirms this. Similarly, no code at all can > explain why you feel to be the one in W, instead of the one in M, in > the WM-duplication experience. Computers are not just confronted with > symbol, but also with truth. > > > > > Instead the public-facing computation follows from the experienced > > sense of what is to be communicated in general, from the top down, > > and the inside out. > > > OK. But that does not distinguish a carbon brain from a silicon machine. > The silicon machine is built from the bottom up and the outside in. It doesn't develop its own agenda, it only mindlessly executes an alien agenda. Craig > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
