On 24 January 2014 01:15, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Thursday, January 23, 2014 5:39:08 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: >> >> On 13 January 2014 00:40, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote: >> > Here then is simpler and more familiar example of how computation can >> > differ >> > from natural understanding which is not susceptible to any mereological >> > Systems argument. >> > >> > If any of you have use passwords which are based on a pattern of >> > keystrokes >> > rather than the letters on the keys, you know that you can enter your >> > password every day without ever knowing what it is you are typing >> > (something >> > with a #r5f^ in it…?). >> > >> > I think this is a good analogy for machine intelligence. By storing and >> > copying procedures, a pseudo-semantic analysis can be performed, but it >> > is >> > an instrumental logic that has no way to access the letters of the >> > ‘human >> > keyboard’. The universal machine’s keyboard is blank and consists only >> > of >> > theoretical x,y coordinates where keys would be. No matter how good or >> > sophisticated the machine is, it will still have no way to understand >> > what >> > the particular keystrokes "mean" to a person, only how they fit in with >> > whatever set of fixed possibilities has been defined. >> > >> > Taking the analogy further, the human keyboard only applies to public >> > communication. Privately, we have no keys to strike, and entire >> > paragraphs >> > or books can be represented by a single thought. Unlike computers, we do >> > not >> > have to build our ideas up from syntactic digits. Instead the >> > public-facing >> > computation follows from the experienced sense of what is to be >> > communicated >> > in general, from the top down, and the inside out. >> >> I think you have a problem with the idea that a system could display >> properties that are not obvious from examining its parts. There's no >> way to argue around this, you just believe it and that's that. > > > I don't have a problem with the idea that a "system" could DISPLAY > properties that are not obvious from EXAMINING its "parts", but you overlook > that DISPLAYING and EXAMINING are functions of consciousness only. If they > were not, then consciousness would be superfluous. If my brain could examine > the display of the body's environment, then it would, and the presence or > absence of perceptual experience would not make any difference. > > Systems and parts are defined by level of description - scales and scopes of > perception and abstracted potential perception. They aren't primitively > real. A machine is not a machine in its own eyes, but our body is an > expression of a single event which spans a human lifetime. A person is > another expression of that event. The "system" of a person does not emerge > from the activity of the body parts, as the entire coherence of the body is > as a character within relativistically scoped perceptual experiences. > > I don't think that I believe, I think that I understand. I think that you do > not understand what I mean, but are projecting that onto me, and therefore > have assigned a straw man to take my place. It is your straw man projection > who must believe. > > Craig
Tell me what you believe so we can be clear: My understanding is that you believe that if the parts of the Chinese Room don't understand Chinese, then the Chinese Room can't understand Chinese. Have I got this wrong? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
