On 23 Jan 2014, at 15:29, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 6:14:35 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Consider the posts by Craig. He said clearly "no" to that question,
making his assumption (existence of a primitive sense) coherent. But
he used his assumption to justify his negation of comp, but that is
usually invalidated by the fact that machines get the same conclusion
than his. His assumption are also quite fuzzy, but there has never
been any trouble with him, notably because he does never insult or
patronized others.



Thanks Bruno, I appreciate that. For the record, I would submit that your ability to see your way through the stereotypical machine beliefs personally suggests that you are setting a double standard whereby a particular machine (namely you, or anyone who subscribes to comp) is exempt from "the fact that machines get the same conclusion".

What makes you believe any machine, including me, can be exempted from that?

It would be exempted for someone who is certain that he is this or that machine. But no machine can be in that state, when consistent.




It's a bit of a loaded question.

Yes. Even diabolically loaded. There is here some philosophical trap. We navigate on the verge of inconsistency. But this is also the place where the math will show the consistency and the necessity.


If I agree with comp then I am in some sense more than machine,


Which I sum up often by: IF my body is a machine, my soul is not.
With body = the 3-I, and soul  = the 1-I.




but if I claim my own authority independent of comp, then my claim is false by comp.


Absolutely not.

All I said is that your claim cannot be use against comp in a valid way. But your claim remain correct. Your soul is not a machine. My point is that this does not refute comp, because with comp it is a theorem: all machine's soul are not machine.

It means that you are introspectively correct. You say something true about you, but not about the machines when you deprived them of a soul.

The wonderful things is that if you identify soul and the knower or the first person pov, using the oldest definition (Theaetetus, Plotinus, the true believer), you get, thanks to incompleteness exactly that.

You get a machine's soul, which is even worst that not being a machine, it is even a non nameable, by the machine, entity.

To anticipate an answer to David Nyman, it might be the universal conscious first person. A common inner God shared by all good willing machines.






I see it the other way around. If sense is primary, then logic is the extension of sense into the unsensed. It is mechanized inference, aka, computation. It uses the 'space between' sense to infer measurement, and as such, does indeed access a kind of interstitial Platonic matrix of eternal truths...however, in my view, they are only truths about how sense interacts with itself from a distance - very close to sense, but not quite as fundamental. In this way, computation is something like the 'perfect imperfect' - the imposter, an emulator and digitizer of proprietary content into public, anonymous 'films' of sense.

Because you see only the body. I think.



From that perspective, I think that it makes sense that logic mistakes itself for sense, so that the fact that logic itself would reflect the assumptions that those with logical minds tend to make is consistent.

I hope you follow the modal thread. Eventually, that is all what the math will be about.

I have no problem with your theory, as long as my sun in law can go in your restaurant. I have never said that your theory is not correct, just that your use of it against comp was not valid. Indeed, your theory will match the third machine hypostase.

Comp, like the Gödel sentence, is a bit diabolical, because it explains that you cannot really believe in comp, from your first person perspective. People who find comp obvious (like many materialist) get it wrong. It is truly unbelievable, and the more you understand it, the less easy you can believe in it.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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