On 17 February 2014 17:46, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 17 Feb 2014, at 14:13, David Nyman wrote: > > On 16 February 2014 16:17, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> The whole schema - "physics" included - would then have to be >> considered an epiphenomenon of some inaccessible ur-physics. >> >> Exactly. >> >> I'm not sure that it's exactly a contradiction just because of that, >> though, as in practice any putative ontological base - numbers included - >> must be inaccessible in this sense, except to theory. >> >> It illustrates, perhaps better than step 8, the difficulty of wanting a >> primitive matter having a primitive ontological reality capable of >> singularizing a conscious person capable to refer to it. >> >> I have to think more about this. >> > > I must say that it is this form of argument that most forcefully persuades > me that the reversal of comp-physics is necessary if CTM is to be > salvageable. > > > Interesting. > > > ISTM that MGA or Maudlin-style arguments tend to lead to somewhat ad hoc > quibbling over the role of counterfactuals or the like. > > > Strictly speaking MGA avoids the counterfactuals, but Maudlin does. > > And as quantum logic can be seen as a sort of logic of conditionals, or > even counterfactuals, I am not sure if that confrontation with the > counterfactuals is not interesting per se. > > There might be some sense in the quibble. >
> Here, we see that the very notion of "epiphenomenon" is related to a > notion of causality, with his typical one way (matter -> consciousness) > causality. > > But this asks for a notion of causality (which usually rise up the notion > of counterfactuals). > > With comp (with the consequences) we can derive the main notion of > causality for the indexical type of points of view "[]" (when A -> B is a > law: in all worlds where A is true, B is true: that is [](A -> B). > I must admit it hasn't been entirely clear to me why you decided that the MGA can go through without addressing the counterfactuals, especially since Maudlin felt he had to address them in his alternative formulation. I appreciate that Maudlin proceeds by trivialising the amount of activity involved in the computation whereas MGA relies on evacuating the notion of physical computation itself, but does the latter approach obviate the need to account for any possible counterfactual activity? > > But the comp account of consciousness - or indeed any non-eliminativist > position - strongly entails that thought can refer only to epiphenomenal > matter (to continue with that way of speaking). > > > I guess that is the major attraction for idealist theories. It is easier > to explain the illusion of matter to a conscious being than to explain the > illusion of consciousness (a quasi contradiction) to a piece of matter. > > > The leap from epiphenomenal to primitive matter then seems inadequately > motivated, to say the least. > > > OK. It is last God-of-the-gap. But it has a strong natural appeal, making > the "correct" theory necessarily counterintuitive. > > > The most typical explicit motivation is by appeal to evolutionary > arguments - e.g. that we have evolved more-or-less accurate internal models > to aid in our survival in the "real" external world of physics. But this > appeal conceals a blatant begging of the question: yes, it must *appear* > so, but it is precisely these appearances that we should seek to explain on > independent grounds, not by assuming what is to be explained. > > > I agree. > > > I wonder if you have had any further thoughts? > > > I have to say that the notion of epiphenomenon plunges me in an abyss of > perplexity. The notion of causalities and responsibilities are modal > "realities", notably due to the nuances between true, justifiable, > observable, knowable, etc. > > The natural picture we get assuming computationalism is conceptually > transparent. We start from the arithmetical truth, which most people can > understand the meaning of the sentences (before deciding its truth if > ever). Then it is part of arithmetical truth that "Turing (universal) > machines" exists and are involved in an intricate web of dreams, in which > the self-referential constraints of relative self-correctness brought a non > trivial invariant, sort of universal person. With comp it can only be a > sort of baby, as any piece of life would particularizes it already. > > I often present the three primary hypostases in the order > > 1) p that is arithmetical truth > 2) []p (beweisbar(p)) the intelligible > 3) []p & p (the soul, the first person, the knower (Theaetetus)) > > But the more logical order from inside is that we start from p, and keep p > along with the logical birth of the "man" ([]p). > So "man" is born with "[]p & p", and it is only > "civilisation/honest-communication" that taught him to separate > "[]p" from "[]p & p". Epiphenomenalism might be related to our > necessarily inability to see that, or know when, they are equivalent. A > secret well kept by G* minus G, for the consistent, and a fortiori, the > correct machines. > I can speculate that the left brain is more specialized in []p and the > right brain is more specialized in []p & p. The soul is lives at the > intersection of belief and truth. > Might one not say that the soul lives in the gap that appears at the intersection of belief and truth? It occurs to me that if, as you say above, the more logical order is to begin with the "primordial" notion of arithmetical truth, that proceeding in this order might help Craig to appreciate that what he sees as his categorical dispute with comp may be more apparent than real. Much of the wrangling seems to have been about what should be deemed fundamental or primordial and the step-wise form of your argument might easily cause someone to lose sight of the fact that everything argued for is nonetheless "there at the beginning". Consequently, whatever is to be found when we arrive at the ineliminable gap between belief and truth is also primordial in some sense. Perhaps we can judge from his response to my comments on the other thread where I've tried again to clarify this point. David > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
