On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics of some particular continuation.So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past?This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed digital, I assume? - or that every possible mental state has a precursor. Does computational theory assume this, or can a mind start from a blank state?
Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that everyone seems to be on their first consciousness.
Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness,
I see no reason to assume that.
does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that "I am he as you are he as he is me", etc).
Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to certain physical processes. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
