On Thursday, March 20, 2014 11:09:39 AM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 9:25:44 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 10:06:37 PM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> But all the forms of language do share a common logical basis, according 
>>> to many linguists.  How is it relevant to the logic of a language that it 
>>> can be expressed in different modalities?
>>>
>>
>> It's not relevant to the logic of the language, its relevant to the 
>> overall nature of language. If language were logical, then they would be 
>> universally modality-independent, but what the evidence seems to indicate 
>> is that pure logic or information is not the relevant aspect in developing 
>> language. What matters is the aesthetic engagement. It's about touching and 
>> feeling, not knowing and believing. 
>>>
>>>
> Why would a logical language have to modality-independent? 
>

Because the whole point of logic is to be modality independent.We use logic 
to program computers so that all of our computers can talk to each other. 
If we add a new kind of file for flavors, we don't need to change the 
language, only add a new piece of hardware to stimulate our taste buds or 
brain.
 

> My language developed, presumably, because my brain had sensory data and 
> reward signals it could use to form associations between useful sensory 
> coincidences.
>

Can't your brain form associations between useful sensory coincidences 
without language? Think of your immune system for example. Hundreds of 
billions of cells making billions of new cells all the time...all 
coordinated and integrated to identify and neutralize pathogens. They 
presumably form useful and critically important associations, yet with no 
brain, and possibly no language. I think that the less we presume about the 
development of anything related to consciousness the better off we'll be.
 

>   It formed increasingly high-level associations between bundles of 
> sensory data, eventually also combining sounds and vocal behavior into 
> those associations.  There's nothing obviously intractable about describing 
> such data input and analysis in computational terms.
>

If that were true, the oldest words would describe things like danger or 
food, but they don't. They are concepts like I, who, two, three and five 
(http://media.tumblr.com/8b5d411063f5291737c4a36681474205/tumblr_inline_mmrdbhECQY1qz4rgp.png)

I'm not saying that language isn't computational, I'm saying that for every 
animal except humans, the computational aspect is not primary.
 

>  
>
>>  Since only humans have evolved to create an abstraction layer that cuts 
>>> across aesthetic modalities,
>>>
>>
>> That appears untrue.  I know birds, mammals, some molluscs, and some fish 
>> can reason abstractly about motor behaviors and achieve the same goal with 
>> very different kinds of motor behaviors.
>>
>> You'll have to argue with the Wiki about that...
>>
>> "Animal communication systems routinely combine visible with audible 
>> properties and effects, but not one is modality independent. No vocally 
>> impaired whale, dolphin or songbird, for example, could express its song 
>> repertoire equally in visual display. Indeed, in the case of animal 
>> communication, message and modality are not capable of being disentangled. 
>> Whatever message is being conveyed stems from intrinsic properties of the 
>> signal." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Origin_of_speech
>>
>> 'Intrinsic properties of the signal' = aesthetic texture.
>>
>> Craig
>>
>
> Ah - You didn't specify at first that the "abstraction layer" had to be 
> about communication.  It looked like you were intending to make a general 
> point about aesthetic modality and information content.  As a general point 
> it's untrue.  Lots of animals reason abstractly in certain circumstances.  
> But I could believe it's true or nearly true about communication.  
>

Sure, yeah I'm not saying that animals can't reason abstractly, I'm 
pointing out yet another example where the computationalist theory fails to 
match up with what it would predict. If we apply CTM to communications, we 
should expect all language to develop independent of modality and develop 
modal dependence through increasing layers of complexity. CTM demands that 
qualia is complex, not simple - that something like pain is not actually a 
feeling but in fact a tremendously complex computation that is labeled as a 
feeling by a complex computation (for no particular reason, other than 
labels could theoretically be feelings).
 

>
> There are some cases even then that, even if not strictly counterexamples, 
> stretch the humans-only claim to the breaking, and lead me to be doubtful 
> of it.
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bpTG3bgHLjk : dogs will communicate their 
> desire for attention vocally and visually, depending on the situation
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0iGkpLq5L5Y : Koko the gorilla is 
> controversially claimed to understand certain signs, images, and spoken 
> words, and to produce signs and point to pictures to communicate
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YSjqEopnC9w : dolphins apparently can 
> express and learn from each other via squeals what they learned from humans 
> via signs, which similarly requires abstracted communication skills
>

Yeah, totally. I'm by no means a human exceptionalist. My case against CTM 
is ontological, not biological (although biology just so happens to 
represent a significant ontological barrier that inorganic phenomena may 
never be able to cross).

Craig
 

>
> -Gabe
>

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