A possible one world solution (that I believe explains the Born rule) is Huw Price's time symmetry. But he got evasive when I asked him about the two slit experiment, imho (and I wasn't convinced by his response on gravitational collapse either...)
On 26 March 2014 04:01, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 25 Mar 2014, at 05:48, [email protected] wrote: > > > On Monday, March 24, 2014 4:48:13 AM UTC, chris peck wrote: >> >> The only person in any doubt was you wasn't it Liz? >> >> I found Tegmark's presentation very disappointing. He was alarmingly >> apologetic about MWI pleading that its flaws were mitigated by the fact >> other interpretations had similar flaws; as if the fact someone else is ill >> would make you less ill yourself. I think in the world of QM >> interpretations, with bugger all evidence to decide between them, the game >> is to even out the playing field in terms of flaws and then chase >> parsimony. Ofcourse, whether an infinite set of worlds is more or less >> parsimonious than just one + a few hidden variables, or one + a spooky >> wave function collapse, depends very much on what definition of >> parsimonious you find most fitting. >> > > MWI is refuted by the massive totally unexamined - some unrealized to this > day - assumptions built in at the start. > > > ? > > MWI seems to me to be the literal understanding of QM (without collapse). > It is also a simple consequence of computationalism, except we get a > multi-dreams and the question remains open if this defines a universe, a > multiverse, or a multi-multiverses, etc. (results points toward a > multiverse though). > > > > It's like, local realism - a reasonable assumed universal. > > > Local realism is not part of QM assumption. It is a direct consequence of > the linearity of the Schroedinger Equation, and the linearity of the tensor > products. > > > > But only the bare bones. Assuming locarealism means locality as we > perceive, > > > As we infer from what we perceive. We cannot *perceive" locality by itself. > > > > and classically seems to be. In; these dimensions. But what happens when > science transforms through a major generalization? The hallmark is that not > only theories get merged, broken up, such that everything looks > different. But that the revolution stretchs right out to the conceptual > framework itself...the basic concepts that are upfront necessary to be > shared, for basic communication to take place. It's all concepts broken > apart, while others merged together. We can put some faith in local > realism, but in what dimensionality it's pure, we don't about that yet..we > don't know.MWI assumes that it's a safe scientific known. It isn't. In fact > everything is against that. > > > Personally, even without comp and without QM, "everything" is conceptually > more simpler than any one-thing approach, which always needs much more > particular assumptions. > > > > There literally dozens of others. Like assuming major properties are > duplicated "as is" between higher and lower macrostate layers. MWI'ers need > to assume local realism at quantum levels as is. Unprecedented if true. > Daft in other words. > > > Is it not more simple to assume the same realism at all scale, that to bet > on different one? > > > > > When I throw this at them, the response if there is one is usually6 denial > that MWI needs those massive assumptions and would not have happened > without them. Arguments come the lines of MWI is derived clean from the > wave function or by some other theoretical strtucture, involving simple > assumptions only none of them things like local realism. > > > I agree, except that local realism is, as I said above, a consequence of > the SWE. > > > > > They just don't get it, science, anymore. theories as internal theory > structure get improved all the time as part of an ongoing > progression. Building out an assumption is not a matter of improving theory > structure alone. > > MWI is tied to assuming local realism for all time, because it was only > the extreme and disturbing - incomprehensible even to the greats - > character of quantum strangenessl. MWI is tied to it, because that is what > it took hat an outrageous, unscientific notion like MWI could be taken > seriously at all. > > > Frankly, I believe the exact contrary. MWI is what you get from assuming > the axioms of quantum mechanics, and that is the unitary evolution. > > > > MWI even now, has not defense for itself, without reference to quantum > strangeness,, and restorations to classical determinism. > > > Which I think would be enough to make it most plausible than any other > (sur)-interpretation. But MWI, which is just the SWE "seen from inside", > restore not classical determinism, but also, well, local locality and well > local realism. > > > > > It's a quantum theory, and it's wrong, because it's assumptions are that > the nature of reality is hard tied forever to principles, > > > That's QM. That tomorrow we might discover that QM is false is just > science. But if comp and/or QM is correct, the many-thing will remain with > us, indeed. > > > > hard tied to the complexities of this dimension, this universe right here. > What a joke. The harm done by this theory is immeasurable. A theory > sterile for all time, placed all around the boundaries beyond the frontiers > of science, that can never be discoverex, never be passed through, never be > built over, or under. It's an act of murder of the human and scientific > dreamss > > > Hmm... > I don't want to defend the truth of QM, or the truth of comp, or the truth > of the MW. But I do believe that QM, or just comp, implies the Many World. > > Now, let us be careful. Computationalism implies that we don't need to > assume more than the natural numbers and their + and * laws. So, strictly > speaking, it is a 0-world theory, or a 0-physical-world theory. With comp, > worlds "made-of-matter" are only a first person plural view, but then that > inside view is, from inside arithmetic, structured as a multiverse. So no > universe at all is "real", but our "physical universe" is not more real > than the "parallel universe". > > It is reassuring for me that you seem to have the same difficulties with > Everett than with comp's consequence. That is at least coherent. > > Bruno > > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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