On Wednesday, May 21, 2014 7:20:27 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 21 May 2014, at 15:28, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > > On Tuesday, May 20, 2014 3:04:18 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 19 May 2014, at 20:14, [email protected] wrote: > > > On Monday, May 19, 2014 7:26:40 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 18 May 2014, at 21:16, [email protected] wrote: > > Does this computer architecture assume not-comp? > > > No. Elementary arithmetic emulates n-synchronized oscillators for all n, > even infinite enumerable set of oscillators. You would need a continuum of > oscillators, with an explicit special non computable hamiltonian. Today, > there is nothing in nature which would threat comp, except the collapse of > the wave packet in theories where this is a physical phenomenon. Even in > that case, it would be a computation with oracle, and not change much of > the consequences. Anyway, I am not sure I can make sense of the wave > collapse being a physical phenomenon, and even less that this play a role > in the brain computation. > > > Food for thought there, on the positive side. On the not-negative side, > from my perspective I would probably class comp - or as it can be used - as > an 'infinity theory', which whether correct or not, as I do see it that > way, one major prediction blanketing the whole class would be that it's > actually impossible for any development or surprise to amount to a major > problem for theories in that class, or be influential. Purely as one of the > properties of infinity...there's always a bit more infinity for whatever > comes along. > > > You are right, and wrong. > > Mechanism is usually presented as a form of finitism. Indeed only finite > entities needs to exist. We need only 0, s(0), s(s(s0))), etc. But we need > all of them, if only to explain Church thesis and define what are universal > machines (even if those are finite beings, but to explain their possible > behaviors, which are infinite). > > Then, when taking into account the personal views, the many infinities > arise, but we can locate them somehow in the mind of the machines, as the > basic ontology remains enumerable. > > Yet, what is assumed here is still much less that what is assumed in > particles theory, quantum field theory, etc. > > > I think I mostly get what you've said here....as I've read yours and a few > other peoples take on each point over time. I think it's reasonable to > regard as 'infinity based' thinking, theorizing etc, as one or more of: > > - believes nature has infinite resources it can bring to a converged > dimensionality (I.e. the MWI thinks multiple worlds can be in the same > converged place) > > > Well, not this one. For comp we need to assume a Turing universal reality, > to sustain digital brains, but we don't need, in the assumption of comp, > that nature has infinite resource. Indeed, we need it provisionally at step > 7, but eliminate it at step 8. > > Of course we assume some understanding of what is meant by the sequence i, > ii, iii, iiii, ... or 0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc. > > > > > - solves a problem with a hypothesis involving the anthropic principle if > part of that solutution implies an effectively infinite space > > > Not solve a problem, but formulating it (and solving the propositional > part, if you want). > And not anthropic, but Turing-Tropic, universal-number tropic. A notion > definable in arithmetic. > > > > > > - believes a theory absent verified predictions : the reason this one > qualifies in my view is because in this day and age, anyone that does this > ends up with infinity thinking, because that the major problem and threat > facing the future of science. > > > You don't believe that each natural numbers has a successor? > > > > > > - OR a theory that IMPLIES and SUPPORTS a infinity theory. > > > Comp is a finitism, and thus share this concerns to some point but after > Gödel and Turing, we know we can't prevent the numbers to organize > themselves in infinitely many ways. You need to be an ultrafinitists if you > want get rid of all infinities, but then you should have stand up in high > school and leave the class when they explained to you calculus. > I doubt that you are an ultrafinitist. Again, by step 8, you will still to > add magic to get consciousness related to physical events. > > > > > Because if that is the case, it is now with 'consequences' an infinity > theory. > > > Well, to understand the definition of comp, you need to have an idea of > what is meant by 0, s(0), s(s(0)) ... > > > > > > > > > > > So on the side in which I'm secretly interested and entertaining > this infinity paradigm it's food for thought. On the other > not-not-entertaining side, nothing new has been said about comp at all. > > > ? > Well, I don't want to brag on the newness, but usually people consider as > new the following things: > - the existence of the first person indeterminacy > - the incompatiçbility between mechanism and materialism > - the idea that physics is derivable by machine's introspection, and thus > that physicalism has to be replaced, for those wanting comp to be true, by > a form of arithmeticalism (classified as finitism, see for example the book > by judson Webb : "mentalism, finitism and metamathematics"). > > > If you listen to nothing else I ever say, please please listen to this: > it's really bad that you've wrapped yourself in this modesty thing. > > > ? > I thought that just above, I was no so modest. > > I think my work is simple. My chance was the overlap of amoebas and > cantor, then Gödel use of the diagonalization. And then that we fail on the > mind-body problem since a long time, and that we can expect a solution > coming from a change of perspective. > > > > > I can obviously appreciate the sentiment underneath..I'm sure it kicked > off virtuous. > > > It is werid, I just was'nt. > > Let us focus on the point. > > > But it sort of psychologically encourages behaviours that a lot of people > - particularly very sceptical people - will find suspicious. > > > If you get into that type of meta-thinking, you can lost yourself. It is > simpler to just focus on the point. > > Very skeptical people can read the text and think by themselves, and see > that I am too very skeptical (on *all* the aristotelian gods). > > > > > > > > For example, I think there's a link somewhere between not being clear > > > > On what. If anything is not clear, please ask a clarification. > > > > > > and repetitive what you think your big accomplishments are, and - possibly > - getting into habits that probably start with trying to find lots of > different metaphors or arguments to represent your ideas (because that > would be one way to avoid appearing to repeat key accomplishments)...which > can lead to situations where a sceptical person is challenging you about > something you've said in the past, which you may not even remember that > well, because it was a metaphor...a kind experimental statement. > > > Could you abandon the ad hominem remarks, the meta-meta-statements and > focus on the point which might not been clear to you. > > I have no clue at all what you don't understand in the UDA. > In AUDA, I know you are not at ease with the math. But any patient person > can understand the main lines, and verify at least that the theorem I used > are proved in the literature, or in my longer text. > > > > > > > In that situation on your side it will seem natural and reasonable to > simply reformulate the same underlying and represent it. But to the person > that has challenged the earlier thing..,,.that will start to look > intellectually dishonest. > > > ? > > Please focus on the points, not on the pedagogy. > > > > There are other behaviours, that can come. I think this thing about being > logician and not believing in the theory. Again, it might have been true at > some point., It might be true now. But that's something that has to > reviewed by you on a regular basis. > > > When I talk to someone who persists in attributing beliefs that I have > not. I have to repeat, for example, that I do not believe in comp, and that > I do not believe in not-comp. I am agnostic, and in all case, that is > private and should interest no one. > > > > > > Because you frequently also so you believe your theory is true. > > > ? > No. I believe my reasoning is very plausibly valid, as it has passed > successfully many peer reviews. > You just cannot assert that I believe comp, or in its consequences. Of > course, from what I know about biology and quantum physics, comp seems > plausible. > This approach has a weakness, which is that it leads to math and computer > science, which most people don't know (but with comp, that was expected). > > > > You've recently said this a thread in your last 20 or 30 posts. > > > I don't believe you. > > > > > Also your behaviour is absolutely identical to someone that totally > commits and invests in an idea and is very protective and single-minded > about it. And a sceptical person will judge the behaviour and the words > together, and if there is a conflict, the behaviour will be taken as true. > > > Please, come back on the point, and not on me. > > > > > > But IMHO there's an even worse thing about this logician/doesn't-belive > gig. Bruno......you are marvellous the way you are. Apart from the > falsification thing. > > > Please explain me why you think that comp (+the theaetetus definition) are > no falsifiable. I tried to explain you, but of course that is technical. > > You cannot say both: your theory is not falsifiable and I have not the > skill to follow where you show that is falsifiable. Unless you repeat a > rumor, because that falsifiability point is the main result of the thesis. > > At first comp looks falsified, as it leads to the white rabbit inflations. > > I am not sure you get the UDA point. You seem to not see that I am > submitting a problem, and partially solving them. > > > > I'm interested in history, and I've studied a few of the geniuses...though > more circumstances around them. They were LUNATICS Bruno..obsessed maniacs > willing to do ANYTHING to get that next insight. These aren't people that > were willing doubt their beliefs on the basis of a rhetorical argument, > convention, populist standing, grant availaibility. Conjecture and > Refutation? Get the hell out of here! When has Deutsch ever done the C&R > thing with anyone resulting in Deutsch changing a view? Never that I can > find. > > But there's a reason and it's because it's amazing hard because reality is > so freaky. That's what it takes. I'm interested in your because you're a > lunatic. I don't know if you're going the right way. I think and hope you > will convert your work to predictive course...which would require stripping > back a lot of things...for now. But maybe I'm wrong...maybe you can see a > prediction in the future....in which case keep going I guess. But it's > definitely people like you really are, than these cool logician types that > don't believe anything, that change the world,. > > > I have no interest in Bruno Marchal. But I have a passion for the löbian > machine and the arithmetical dream, and a passion to share it with people > interested. Nothing else. > > But you, Alberto, you seem to appreciate beating around the bush, ad > infinitum. > > > > > > > > It is not ultrafinitism, which denies that "infinite" makes any sense (but > is self-defeating, as it needs to give some sense to infinity to deny it). > That is a bit like John Mike said once for "atheism". > > > > So dwelling on that side as I am wont to do, for a chance of new > value Bruno, I need to formulate a question that bridges the > divide allowing possibility of value both sides. So here it is. > > If this new architecture indeed happens to be sub-class for mimicking the > brain...and maybe something like, ok comp will probably so no anything can > be simulated on anything,. > > > I do have some problem to parse that sentence. > > > > > But within that there's a realistic open question, say to do with our > local apparent physically, which obviously would > include apparently physical materials out of which we build things, which > feasibly being non-fundamental may be informationally or other such > constrained within this apparently real dimensions, such that - feasibly - > yes anything can be simulated on anything, > > > ? > > The arithmetical reality, which does plays a role in comp, is full of > things which are not Turing emulable. Only a tiny part opf arithmetic is > Turing emulable. Most of it is not, and comp predicts that the physical > reality has to inherit at least one non computable aspects. > > > Just as a random sampling can you provide the over-view tsoning and > published reference for what you say above? > > > I have already prove many of this, in this list. For example, the notion > of "totality" Being a machine, or a descriotion of a machine, computing a > total function, is not something algorithmically solvable. This follows in > one (double) diagonalization from Church thesis. > > The semantic equality is no computable either. That is the fact that phi_x > and phi_y, with x ≠ y, compute the same function (and this in any base > phi_i). recursion theory studies the degrees of insolubility of the > arithmetical relation, notably. > > A very good book is: > > ROGERS H.,1967, Theory of Recursive Functions and Effective Computability, > McGraw- > Hill, 1967. (2ed, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1987). > > A more introductory book is: > > CUTLAND N. J., 1980, Computability An introduction to recursive function > theory, > Cambridge University Press. > > But Cutland does not study the arithmetical hierarchy, only the > beginnings. > > > > > > > > The apparent Turing emulability of the physical laws is a threat for comp, > a priori. > > > > > but somethings in the multiverse are that complex that simulating them on > our local physicality, requires large amounts of it,. > > > Yes. > > > > > So maybe - and let's say the doctor asks the question before anyone > discovers the above architiecture - and it so happens the digital brain is > materially in terms of atoms insufficient in terms of weight to do the job, > but by very unlucky mischance, it so happens it's exactly enough to do > everything just like the brain is conscious but sadly would require a > boulder sized object to generate the consciousness, or maybe a planet size. > > > > Then we got zombie. But the consequences of the reasoning remains, unless > you need an infinity amount of material things to do the job, in which case > non-comp is true, and we are out of the scope of this theory. > > > > I think it is very relevant Bruno. It reveals, I think, how irrational and > wreckless it would be for anyone to say yes to the doctor. > > > Aaaaaaaahhh. > > You believe in non-comp! > > You stop at step zero. > > But I have no problem with that. You did not prove that comp is false, and > you can still appreciate the validity of the reasoning, which is the only > thing I try to share. > > > > Because We...and You...Don't know...how consciousness comes about, and > have no answer as to whether that digital is conscious at all. > > > > That is the point of making an axiom, like the invariance of consciousness > for a digital transplant done at some level. > > We cannot know if that is true or false (nor can we really know that for > any transplants, or even taking a plane, or drinking orange juice). > > But we can study the consequences of the > axioms/postulates/hypothesis/theory. > > That *is* being scientific, and I have played, successfully, the > academical duties for that effect. > > I hope you are not influenced by rumors I have been reported. I am aware > that some academicians pretend having a problem, but when I succeed to > communicate with them, it is a chimera. They thought I said something, but > they are not able to find the place I said it, and eventually recognized > they were just misreading me, which is normal in a difficult subject. > > I don't think there is anything controversial in what I say. > > Shocking? Possible. But no more than QM. > > > > > > > > > > > > > So, unless there's a good reason why this is absolutely not a possible > situation ever in the multiverse, why would you say yes to the doctor, not > knowing absent hard theory for consciousness, whether the particular > materials and computer architecture was right? > > > The reason to say "yes" or "no" to the doctor are private. Some will say > "yes" because the alternative is just dying, and they want to see their > grandchildren growing. > > > You're saying I can say yes to the doctor at the point of my death? > > > You can do that. Comp asks nothing, it assumes that we can survive through > a digital emulation of the brain. In case of doubt, it is reasonable to > resist at the point of your death (not easy to determine). I was just > enumerating reason to say "yes" to the doctor. > > > > > What has that proven then...I thought this is supposed to be a statement > of commitment to an idea. Haven't you noticed how no one gives a shit about > the future. A lot of people will say yes to the doctor for a totally > implausible shot at eternal life if it doesn't cost them anything. A lot of > people will be happy to do that if it costs 3M lives in 50 years and will > sign on the dotted line. Because that's exactly what we are doing in a lot > of other ways, and for a lot less than a shot at eternal life...we'll do it > for more luxiourious brand of soap mate. > > > You lost me. Are you saying that comp should be illegal? > > > > > I am publicly agnostic on the truth of comp, and if you want a confession, > I am not sure at all that comp is true. I don't care as I am not defending > any idea, except the logical point that IF comp is true, then the theology > of Plato and the mystics is right and the theology of Aristotle and the > naturalists are wrong (to be short). > > > On the grounds of behaviour and your many other public statements, I > don't accept it.....not in any meaningful sense.....and thank god you're > not. > > > You did not prove that comp is false, nor did you mention an invalid step > in the UDA reasoning. > And you confess having not the skill to understand the AUDA falsification > part. > > But now that you tell us that you believe that comp is false, I am not so > astonished. You still miss a real opportunity to refute comp, at the same > time. > No. I don't have to say comp is false. I'm saying that the assumption is not carrying much knowledge. It would be like in 1700 someone proposing the universe was made of the same matter. It'd be true, we know that now. So small and large theories came out that started with that assumption alone, and came up with streams of logic...leading to dreams and gods and whatever. And there'd be guys in your role and guys in my role, and in my role they'd be saying "I don't think it's wrong, I just think the initial assumption is not carrying much knowledge. And the guy in your role would be saying "ah...so you do assume not-matter"
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