On 22 May 2014, at 14:15, [email protected] wrote:


On Thursday, May 22, 2014 8:06:52 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 May 2014, at 21:50, [email protected] wrote:


On Wednesday, May 21, 2014 7:20:27 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 May 2014, at 15:28, [email protected] wrote:



But now that you tell us that you believe that comp is false, I am not so astonished. You still miss a real opportunity to refute comp, at the same time.

No. I don't have to say comp is false. I'm saying that the assumption is not carrying much knowledge. It would be like in 1700 someone proposing the universe was made of the same matter. It'd be true, we know that now. So small and large theories came out that started with that assumption alone, and came up with streams of logic...leading to dreams and gods and whatever. And there'd be guys in your role and guys in my role, and in my role they'd be saying "I don't think it's wrong, I just think the initial assumption is not carrying much knowledge. And the guy in your role would be saying "ah...so you do assume not-matter"


But if you believe this, then you have to believe that something is wrong in the UD Argument, as it shows that comp is a very strong hypothesis, leading to the reversal physics/machine's psychology, or machine's theology. What step is wrong? Are you OK with step 3 (where John Clark miss the use of the 1p/3p distinction if you have follow the thread), or is it step 8?

Why Bruno? I'm talking about your seed assumption.

You think you have a refutation of comp? Like Craig? I have not seen it.




How about do the other way around.

Because what I present has been submitted, defend as a thesis, published, and it seems you have a philosophical opinion that comp is false, but you have not present. I look at your posts and don't find it.



Read my post on the 'end to end structure associated wit (sic) falsification' , tell me where you disagree, or....present your falsifiability carefully in those terms.

I see only meta-remarks. Can you at least confirm that you pretend to have a refutation of comp. You are quite unclear.



Because there's two areas here. One is issue about your initial assumption.

Well, it is no mine. It is a very old assumption, made clear in the digital frame by Church thesis.



We spent ages on that, in which I was trying to put the case for UNREALIZED assumptions. Drew a blank there.

What do you mean by unrealized assumption? Do you mean an implicit assumption? Which one?




Then there's matter of your claim to falsifiability. On that one I've actually thrown down the gauntlet. The challenge is that you actually present your falsifiability in the terms I laid out.

Why? For scientists it is enough to be falsifiable in the common sense of the term. I offer an infinity of ways to refute comp (classical comp). I am not sure they are not in the terms you lay down. Even with only UDA, you can understand that the comp physics is falsifiable. AUDA shows that the actual quantum physics does not yet refute it (although comp already refutes newton physics, etc.).




Or, you disagree with those terms in which case we can start looking for third party resolution of who is right.

It is just I have no clue how you can both say you have not the skill to understand AUDA, and claim you have refute the statement that comp is refutable. This is already a contradiction. I doubt we can proceed if you don't invest a bit more in the technicalities.

Let me ask you this. Do you agree that quantum logic is falsifiable? Putnam did go so far on this that he suggests that logic is empirical, and I would say that quantum logic is like that. Without inferring QM from observation, we would not have discovered QL before comp. If you agree that quantum logic is empirical, then we are done, as the test for classical comp consists in comparing the QL extracted from comp, and the QL inferred from the observation. OK?

Bruno





--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to