On 12 Feb 2014, at 12:25, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-02-12 12:17 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>:
On 12 Feb 2014, at 01:50, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote:
On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical realism
in
the sense required for this argument. I think consciousness depends
of
consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about Peano's
arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the
"ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous. There are
obvious
physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be ineffable.
That's
why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of
arithmetic?)
are possible independent of any external world - or looked at
another way,
I think to make it work would require that the 'inert' computation
simulate
a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist *relative*
to
that world.
Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the initial
assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8!
I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial
computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual
senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated
reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate.
I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument.
I'm not yet convinced it is a genuine problem for step 8, or not, as
I still
don't feel I fully understand what that says yet.
At step seven, the primitive materialist can still invoke a
physicalist form of ultrafinitism, to prevent the comp reversal
between physics and arithmetic (or number theology).
Step 8, shows that if that move is done, then we have to attribute
some non Turing emulable, but also non FPI recoverable properties in
that primitive matter to instantiate consciousness. It gives to the
primitive materialist a hint to refute comp: 1) to define what they
mean by primitive matter,
It could be as Peter Jones said the thing that renders it real...
only computations implemented in matter are real... AR as such would
be false, a mathematical statement not implemented in matter is
indeterminate, the truth value only come from implementation.
Computationalism + realness ingredient could still be possible and
evade UDA conclusion... at the costs of some "magical" property.
I am OK with this, and it is related on the "falsification" issue. It
is an important thread on which we will have to come back.
Bruno
Quentin
and 2) to show that such matter relies on non FPI recoverable
properties.
But that is equivalent with the test that comp offers, so it cannot
be a refutation of comp->reversal, but of comp itself.
To be short. We will have opportunities to come back on this. But
only if most are OK, with the steps 0-7.
Best,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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