On 10 Jun 2014, at 21:00, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
On Tue, Jun 10, 2014 at 8:25 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 10 Jun 2014, at 06:51, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Jun 10, 2014 at 04:39:14PM +1200, LizR wrote:
On 10 June 2014 14:52, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 6/9/2014 6:48 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
OK - there are 2 future branches, A and B, each of which have equal
objective probability of occurring. Ie the Born rule says each has a
probability of 0.5.
However, perhaps _subjectively_, Alice sees branch A with probability
0.9 and branch B with probability 0.1, and Bob sees branch A with
probability 0.1 and branch B with probability 0.9.
If there are only two branches then Alice see each with probability
1.0.
From a bird's eye view you can renormalize this and call it 0.5.
But I
don't see any way to even assign meaning to 0.1 or 0.9 when the branch
probabilities are 0.5.
Me neither. Glad we agree on something :-)
Over to you, Russell. What are we missing?
The probabilities are those of entering branch A or B from the
unbranched state the precedes them.
You're making an assumption that this measure is proportional to the
cardinality of those branches. I'm making no such assumption. That's
all.
But then your first person experience will depart from the gaussian
one, that we can observe, in the 3p view of the many 1-views which
are defined by the testimony of the experiences in the observable
many diaries. In the iterated WM duplication, you will get a
majority of doppelgangers criticizing your "selection" as arbitrary.
Of course this is assuming we already inherit the normality which
must exist with comp, and seems to exist technically, and also
empirically, of course, ... well I hope.
I think I see what is meant, but can you elaborate on why "normality
must exist with comp/technically"?
Let us consider the iterated WM-duplication, n times to fix the thing.
I defined the FPI by the 3p view on the 1-views, themselves defined by
the content of the diaries of the copies.
So, imagine someone who, Like Russell (in this context), believes that
he can influence his first person outcome. Let us take the extreme
case that he is sure that P(W) = 1 (with W = I feel to be the one
seeing W and not seeing M).
After ten iteration, we have 2^10 diaries (= 1024 diaries).
There is the one with only W in his history:
WWWWWWWWWW
That one will say something like "I knew it" as his prediction is
verified. But there will be 1023 other copies who will harbor doubt,
and in the FPI we listen to them too, as comp asks us to not take them
as zombie. For comp, all copies are equal, and self-selection criteria
among them are elusive/magical.
If you ask what is the probability of seeing W exactly four times,
this will be given by the binomial of Newton's coefficients (or Pascal
triangle) or, in the limit of n going enough big, by the Gaussian
distribution (by some law of big numbers).
So normality exists only because we don't put a selection among all
the copies. Like Liz, I am not sure Russell's idea can make sense,
when we assume computationalism. Certainly not with the 3p describable
notion of 1p indeterminacy from which such influence departs.
Bruno
PGC
Bruno
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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected]
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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