On 9/17/2014 5:27 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 03:30:55PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Sep 2014, at 05:46, Russell Standish wrote:



I tend to think that thermostat are not conscious. They are not
universal.

So adding a universal machine to a thermostat makes it conscious? The
Nest smart sensors are conscious? Forgive my chortle.

Well, according to Bruno, consciousness would supervene on the TM+thermostat. But it wouldn't supervene on the thermostat. But what is a "universal machine"? Is it a machine that is capable of being programmed to calculated all recursively enumerable functions? Does it have to be so programmed? Does it have to be executing the program? Is it conscious simply in virtue to be /capable/ of something, even though it's inert?


...

I agree that to have awareness, you need a self, a third person
self. But that is well played by the relative body (actually bodies,
incarnate through the UD).

Maybe we should define consciousness by self-awareness, and then
self-consciousness would be the higher form of self-self-awareness?
That makes one "self" per reflexive loop.

What's the distinction?
Between what? Consciousness (self-awareness) needs, as you say, a
self. Self-consciousness (self-self-awareness) needs not only a
self, but an awareness that there is a self. The distinction is that
in the first case we don't have Kp -> KKp. It is the difference
between universal and Löbian, or between Robinson Arithmetic (RA)
and Peano Arithmetic (PA). technically, universality implies the
existence of one reflexive loop, and Löbianity gives the cognitive
faculty of being able to know our own universality.

OK - you've clarified your terminology, but I think it is nonstandard.

Self-aware means "aware of your self".
One could say self-conscious as being "conscious of your self", except
that I don't think there is any distinction in meaning between
awareness and consciousness.

BTW - conceptually, I don't see any inherent reason why a self is
needed just to be aware (or conscious), except that a self is a bloody
useful thing, evolutionarily speaking - helps the immune system stop
parasites and pathogens, for example - also helps you stop injuring
your body (see what happens to people who lose their sense of touch,
or their proprioception or nociception (pain)).

I agree. A thermostat is aware (of the temperature and the setting), but it's not self-aware, it has no concept of self.


I address this in the paper.
But my comment sum up where I disagree. I will comment more
precisely when I have more times.



What you go on to say that consciousness
C (ie the consciousness attached to body C, which is in B) supervenes
on B+A, which is correct.
OK, so you agree that Alice's consciousness supervenes on Alice's
body + Bob's body + the room + the entire universe + the entire UD*.
OK?





But my point is that consciousness itself
(not necessarily attached to a particular body or person)
You mean the existence of consciousness?



is not
supervenient on B+A in this case, as the consciousness could be a C or
a D (where D supervenes on A).
?
I agree, (assuming always some neuro-assumption to make things
simple) that Alice's consciousness does not supervene on Bob's brain
activity, but it does supervenes on Alice + Bob brains activities.



Where this matters is that one cannot say consciousness supervenes on
the universal dovetailer.
I really don't see this. That contradict the fact that if A
supervenes on B, it supervenes on A+B.

If Alice consciousness supervenes on say one computation in the UD*,
it supervenes on that computation + all the others.

The computation here is the UD. If Alice experiences a different
thought, then the UD does not change, as the UD calculates that
experience too. Consequently, Alice's consciousness cannot supervene
on the UD itself. Only on some computations that the UD executes.

An implicit temporality has been introduced here. Alice experiences a different thought at a different time. But time is a relative variable which is also being calculated by the UD. From the standpoint of comp and the UD there is no temporality or change. The consciousness we call Alice's is a lot of threads and the totality of them is atemporal.

Brent


Assuming COMP, of course.

Maybe the classroom analogy is not clearly enough expressed, because
you still say Alice's consciousness, not consciousness (in general)


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