On 25 October 2014 12:19, Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:38:48PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > > On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 6:55 PM, Russell Standish <[email protected] > > > > wrote: > > > > > Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal > > > (experienced) world if COMP is true. > > > > > > > OK then "comp" is false. And now that we know that "comp" is false > what's > > the point of talking about it anymore? > > > > So you know for certainty that the arrival times of electrons in a > Geiger counter from a beta decay source is computable. How? > This point was originally about real numbers (wasn't it?) You (Russell) said that Bruno has shown that real numbers must be part of the phenomenal world if comp is true, but not ontological (because comp assumes only integer arithmetic and that only with certain operations). I'm not sure if I follow this, but my guess is that comp says that some phenomena we experience can generate an arbitrary string of random digits - as many digits as we care to measure. Or something like that...? I guess that has to be the case if there is first person indeterminacy. Or have I got this completely wrong? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
