On 18 November 2014 00:44, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 17 Nov 2014, at 07:21, meekerdb wrote: > > On 11/16/2014 7:15 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> >>> meekerdb wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 11/16/2014 10:51 AM, LizR wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 17 November 2014 00:31, Bruno Marchal <[email protected] <mailto: >>>>> [email protected]>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Heisenberg was influenced by the positivism of the time (The >>>>> Vienna circles, the young Wittgenstein, etc.). That was very bad >>>>> philosophy, and we can say that is is virtually abandoned. >>>>> Positivism is easily shown self-defeating or just an >>>>> instrumentalism which abandon fundamental research. >>>>> >>>>> Isn't that the Popperian view - falsification and so on - that David >>>>> Deutsch is so keen on in FOR? Or am I getting my wires crossed? If it is, >>>>> I >>>>> didn't know it had been abandoned. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I think Deutsch takes the view that explanation is the important >>>> function of science, whereas positivist eschew explanation and aim for >>>> prediction. Being falsifiable in principle is still considered an >>>> essential attribute of any scientific theory, but "in principle" can be >>>> pretty broadly intepreted. >>>> >>> >>> It is a while since I read Deutsch, but I think one could categorize his >>> position as that of a (super)realist. Positivism does not really eschew >>> explanation: the characteristic of positivism is that observation is >>> paramount and theoretical terms are accepted only in so far as they can be >>> reduced to observational statements. This philosophy has gone out of >>> fashion as people have realized that not all theoretical terms can be so >>> reduced. The realist position is that the theoretical terms of >>> well-established scientific theories actually correspond to 'elements of >>> reality', or parts of 'the furniture of the world'. Deutsch takes this to >>> extremes with his claim that quantum computing 'proves' the existence of >>> the many worlds of MWI. >>> >> >> I agree. And there's a good reason not to use terms like "proves", when >> there are alternative explanations (e.g. t'Hooft's superdeterminism). The >> scientist's reason for entertaining different formulations and >> interpretations of a theory is that they may suggest extensions of the >> theory, not because he wants the certainty of "proof". >> > > Concerning positivism and Popper (and Deutsch) I agree with you and with > Bruce. I hope this answers Liz, and John Clark. >
I think so. IIRC Popper was one of DD's "4 strands" in FOR, so he is obviously keen on his approach - but it looks like his approach was more extreme than I realised. DD certainly thinks explanation is key, and if Popper thinks it's a sort of add-on extra that puts them rather at odds. I guess Tegmark's "reducing the baggage allowance of physics" is a bit along the same lines as eschewing explanation that can't be turned into statements about observations - at least in principle - but he stops at a bedrock of maths, which presumably positivists wouldn't think was valid. > > I also avoid use of "proof" in applied science (especially when applied in > the search of reality). I use proof only relative to a theory, and in that > case, the notion of "proof" is itself an object of a theory (even if > embeddable in arithmetic). > > But even in math, "proof" is not related to certainty, because we would be > obliged to assume our own correctness, which is impossible to do at the > level of a theory. About reality, science is agnostic, and can only give > plausibilities, never certainties. > > It is one of the lesson of incompleteness: proof = belief. A proof, per > se, is not an indication of truth, even if miraculously you could know that > the axioms of your theory is true. May be I doubt this personally for > elementary arithmetic (the so-called separable part of math where all > scientists agree), but I am not sure. > So AR = elementary arithmetic only. But includes the notion of infinity? > > Bruno > > > > >> Brent >> "As an adolescent I aspired to lasting fame, I craved factual >> certainty, and I thirsted for a meaningful vision of human life-- so I >> became a scientist. This is like becoming an archbishop so you can meet >> girls." >> -- Matt Cartmill >> >>> >>> Falsification is seen as an important element of science, but not >>> necessarily the final touchstone. Naive Popperian falsificationism is >>> clearly wrong, but there are no universally accepted generalizations of >>> falsifiability that measure up to all that one might want. In sum, the >>> Popperian quest for a clear demarcation between science and non-science has >>> assumed a less prominent role in recent philosophy of science. >>> >>> Bruce >>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
