On 26 Dec 2014, at 03:43, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/25/2014 1:17 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
In paper

Forsdyke, D.R. (2009). Samuel Butler and human long term memory: is the cupboard bare? Journal of Theoretical Biology 258(1), 156-164. (see http://post.queensu.ca/~forsdyke/mind01.htm)

the author considers a possibility that the long term memory is outside the brain. I guess that Bruno should like it.

That seems backwards for Bruno's idea. If memories are outside the brain then they should survive destruction of the brain.

But not of the *generalized brain", which in this case might be in the "hologram".



But as I understand Bruno's idea one's "soul" survives destruction of the brain as in reincarnation, but memories don't.

In the computationalist thought experience, we suppose that the generalized brain is the biological brain, and we survive with our memories unchanged. Then, for death, I said that there is an inflation of type of survival possible, some with partial or total amnesia, and others with the complete memory of lifetime staying preserved. Of course we cannot evaluate the probabilities without extracting the (quantum) measure from the material hypostases. (There has been recent progresses, but this is really a program of research for the centuries to come).

I might add that with salvia, I "understand" better that our "deep" identity is indeed not in our memories, but in our universality, so that you can already understand you are immortal, simply because you realize that you are already Peano Arithmetic (say). In that case we are all the same person, just put in different context. This can have positive ethical consequences as you can develop more empathy toward others.

Bruno





Brent

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