On 18 Jan 2015, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 January 2015 at 23:39, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
I agree, with such a constraining definition of "internal" it would
seem that no interaction with the world or other people is
possible. It would only be consistent with a "brain in a vat,
dreaming the world".
I don't see what difference that stipulation would make, frankly. On
Smolin's assumptions a brain, whether in a vat or not, must subject
to the same causally-closed 'external' physical constraints; clearly
then its dreaming must be equivalently constrained. Hence, as
before, if we are to assume that the brain additionally has access
to qualia because of some internal property of its constituent
matter, the problem remains. How is the dreaming (understood
entirely externally) supposed to be related to the qualia
(understood internally)?
But that's pretty close to Bruno's idea of a UD world. The UD
computes (or simulates) the dreaming and the dreamer infers the
physical world (including the existence of others) and there need
only be one computed "dreamer" to dream all the different dreams
having different points of view.
But the crucial difference in this instance, as I understand it, is
that the *same* underlying computational structures (i.e. a common
'neutral' ontology) are capable of being understood in terms of two
distinct logics or epistemologies: 1-personal and 3-personal. Thus
qualia can appear at the level of constitutive or analytic truth in
the 1-personal view, while the parallel references to such truths
appear at the level of 'belief' in the 3-personal view. Thus the
reference problem can (at least in principle) be resolved at the
intersection of two different logics derivative on the same
underlying mechanism.
Indeed, and that is the case when we apply the definition of knowledge
given by the greeks to the Gödel beweisbar arithmetical notion of
belief. It is miraculous, but incompleteness makes this working well.
The 'external-internal' dichotomy is resolved because here matter is
not a fundamental ontological assumption but rather a complex
appearance, epistemologically derivative on a simpler ontology. As
such, it is entirely 'externalised'. Hence it cannot possess (nor is
there any further need to appeal to) any hidden or intrinsic
properties.
... showing Smolin close to panpsychism, indeed. Which solves nothing.
Bruno
David
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