On 20 Jan 2015, at 18:18, David Nyman wrote:
On 20 January 2015 at 17:11, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
At this point, I'm somewhat persuaded that this broader sense of
truth, in approximately Descartes' sense, is in fact highly
relevant to what is special and, so to speak, non-negotiable about
consciousness. It has the virtue that it now makes no sense to say,
as Stathis wants to suggest, that the same scenario could equally
well be describing an 'unconscious' (i.e. untruthful) process.
I am OK, *assuming* mechanism.
But Stathis' suggestion cannot logically be excluded with infinite
machines.
Why not?
Because with sufficiently big infinity in both mind and matter, you
can a priori singularize the experience and the body in a way such
that duplication is no more possible, and there is no more FPI, and we
can use the old identity thesis brain-mind.
That identity thesis might still be ad hoc and unsatisfying, but the
point is that with computationalism, (or with QM without collapse) we
cannot avoid the FPI, so we have to abandon such one-one link.
Bruno
David
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