On 04 Mar 2015, at 02:22, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/3/2015 4:24 PM, LizR wrote:
On 3 March 2015 at 15:33, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au>
wrote:
Also see http://www.arxiv.org/abs/physics/0001020
I've just started reading that paper, and I have a (minor) problem
with this statement:
"Tegmark introduces an ensemble theory based on the idea that every
self consistent mathematical structure be accorded the ontological
status of physical existence."
I don't think the word "physical" should be there (and I imagine
Max T would agree with me). What could it mean for a mathematical
structure to have physical existence?
What does it mean for a chair to have physical existence? I'd say
there are two criteria:
(1) If you kick it, it kicks back (e.g shine light on it and you can
see it).
(2) There is intersubjective agreement about (1) (i.e. other people
can see it).
In sufficiently elaborate digital simulation of our world (1) and
(2) above would be instantiated by some mathematical structures. So
in that world the simulated Max Tegmark would be right. And maybe
we're in that world (but just in a tiny corner since not all
mathematical structures are instantiated *here*.)
If we are in a simulated world, we are in all simulated world, some
normal, or some "perverse bostromian" (made by our normal descendents
who would like to fake our reality). We can test computationalism V
perverse bostromism, if you want.
"Perverse bostromism" is unlikely, it needs infinite work and infinite
perversity, but it cannot be excluded entirely from logic and
arithmetic alone.
(Note that if our descendent simulates us (Bostromisme) and do not
fail us on the physical laws, we remain, from our first person view
(the 3-1-view actually) in all computations, and observe the same
physical laws.
Bruno
Brent
Similarly for "This states that all possible halting programs of a
universal Turing machine have physical existence."
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