On 6 March 2015 at 06:22, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 04 Mar 2015, at 21:36, LizR wrote: > > On 5 March 2015 at 04:37, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> >> So it is not the state of the halting problem which are physical, it is >> the physical which needs to be redefined in term of a measure (or the logic >> of the measure one, of that measure) on the halting programs. >> >> Yes, that's what I was trying to say, in my roundabout way. Using > "physical" confuses the matter, if you'll pardon the pun. > > >> There is no reversal in Tegmark. He misses the mind-body problem in >> general, and the computationalist one in particular. >> > > Yes, he is in the interesting position of being what might be called a > "mathematical materialist" - deriving the material world from maths and > finding he still has the mind-body problem, which he then solves by saying > it isn't a problem (as for example Dennett does. Of course he may be > right...) > > He may be right? Well, even if right, he has to prove it, and by > definition, that is the mind-body problem! >
Yes, you clever logic chopper! But that doesn't mean the problem can't be solved by showing that it's only an apparent problem. I imagine Dennett would say something like this: "Consciousness is a complex illusion generated as a sort of user interface between the brain and the world. It is no more fundamental to reality than the pattern of pixels on my screen is a real desktop. It is an attempt to explain how we have experiences that is based on Cartesian dualism, while science tells us that the world is made of matter, energy, etc - there are no ghosts in the machine - eventually the idea of consciousness being anything more than what I have said will look as outdated as elan vital and phlogiston." Of course this doesn't address the consequencs of taking this view to its logical extreme as Bruno has done (or I should say claims to have done, since I haven't been able to follow the whole argument). I'd be interested to hear what DCD would have say about comp. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
