On 24 Mar 2015, at 01:07, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/23/2015 3:48 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 March 2015 at 16:09, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
That's where the MGA comes in. It purports to show that one of the
possible substrates is inert matter, which seems so absurd that we
should conclude the matter plays no part whatsoever.
That sounds like Maudlin's Olimpia argument....?
It is essentially the same. But I think Maudlin took the other side
of the reductio and concluded that computationalism must be
incomplete.
So far I get that different substrates can create the same
computational states (by which I assume we mean the contents of
registers and memory?) But how does the MGA get from showing that
to showing that inert matter can be a possible substrate? (ISTM
that a projected graph is not inert, if that's the argument.)
Yes, as I understand it that's the argument. It's consistent with
Platonism. A computer program's execution written out on paper is
just as much a calculation as a lot of transistors switching.
Not at all. or you are terribly ambiguous.
A computation occurs when a number relation is true, that is realized
in some reality.
A computation written on a paper is useful to convince some people
that a computation exists in arithmetic, but once written, or encoded
into a Gödel number, it is not a computation.
May be you meant "execution written out on paper during the program
execution"? Then that OK.
By computations and computability, I mean the mathematical, indeed
arithmetical concept discovered by Church, Kleene, Post,, Turing,
Markov.
With Church thesis, it is an easy theorem that all computations are
realized in the sigma_1 complete part of arithmetic (and similarly
when you add oracle, but universal machine cannot distinguish *big*
number/machine with infinite machine (oracle)).
I assume much just less than you. I assume RA, and thanks to you I see
that it gives a form of strict finitism making sense for the universal
machine. Well, that could be defended.
The big discovery is by Turing and other mathematicians. I really
don't assume more than that.
My caveat is that neither of them is conscious in THIS world because
being conscious requires being conscious OF something.
Sure.
An isolated, pure consciousness is an oxymoron. Consciousness only
exists as part of thoughts and thoughts only have meaning by
reference to an external world and potential action in that world.
Agreed. But the question is more between :are we fundamentally mammals
living on earth, or are we universal numbers living in arithmetic,
deluded by oracles or other universal numbers.
I remind that I say that a number u is universal if phi_u("x,y") =
phi_x(y)? For some fixed universal enumeration (of the partial
computable functions).
Even RA can prove the existence of such u, and of its computations.
But RA knows nothing about u abilities, cannot prove that this or that
u is universal. PA can do that, and PA can recognize that PA itself is
such a u. (Like we all do, i mean the humans, but not many knows that).
*that* exists in arithmetic. Logicians knows this for a century now.
That gives a generator of TOEs, any first-order logical specification
of a universal number.
The problem is that the universal numbers get into relations, which
are, well, complicated.
I don't the assumption of a primary physical universe. If I am such a
u (comp) then all what I can be confronted is 1) below my substitution
level: the result of the competition between all universal numbers.
And above, relatively stable universal number, and it is an open
question if there is one precise, univocal, physical universal number.
We can compare the comp classical physics and the empirical physics.
If they differ, it means we have detected an Oracle. It will remain
open if that oracle comes from a perverse bostromian simulation (by
our descendants wanting to fail us), or from some cartesian malin
génie (daemon), that you can call matter or god. I don't think that
there are evidence for such oracle, and to assume them would make
things more complex than we need to do. The competition between all
universal numbers put already enough mess in platonia.
Bruno
Brent
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