On 30 Mar 2015, at 05:45, LizR wrote:
On 30 March 2015 at 15:20, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 9:10 PM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:
But if it were a world of copying machines and John K Clark says "I"
expect to see Moscow tomorrow then who the hell knows what "I" means.
>The same is true of the MWI.
No it is not the same. In the MWI if John Clark says "tomorrow I
will see the electron spin up" then tomorrow there is a clear way
for Liz to determine if the prediction was correct or not because
the the laws pf physics guarantee that Liz will find no ambitious in
the meaning of the personal pronoun "I".
You mean, because I will also be duplicated. That's true.
Nevertheless, if the MWI is correct there is an ambiguity. I'm just
not in a position to experience it. Or rather I only experience it
as quantum uncertainty.
But in the copying machine stuff if John Clark says "tomorrow I will
see Moscow" there is no way that Liz or anybody else can determine
if the prediction was correct or not because nobody knows who the
hell "I" is.
Well, that's the point, I think - even without copying machines, the
MWI implies that our idea of what we are is wrong, or at least
inadequate. if someone asks me whether I'm going to be at work
tomorrow, I'd either state my intention to be, or perhaps give a
"probabalistic" answer (e.g. "yes, unless I catch cold or the ferry
breaks down"). I wouldn't say "yes, no, and I'll be dead, and I'll
also be kidnapped by aliens, and declared Ruler of the world..." -
even though the MWI says that "I" will do everything it's physically
possible for "me" to do, in different branches.
We don't say "I expect to see both spin up and spin down" or "I
expect the cat to be both dead and alive" - even if we believe the
MWI to be true.
That true. in the MWI we don't say that, but even if we did the
statement would not be gibberish it would just turn out to be wrong.
But in the copying machine world "I will see Moscow tomorrow" is
equivalent to "klogknee will see Moscow tomorrow" because both "I"
and "klogknee" are not defined.
I think the MWI version could be considered to be true - that the
"I" who exists before the experiment turns into two people, who
between them perceive both outcomes. But given that we understand
that a duplication occurs in both the MWI and Bruno's thought
experiment, we can see in both cases that there is an "I" who
experiences both outcomes, which we experience from our own
perspective as apparent randomness. Bruno's point is that *if*
consciousness is an outcome of computation, then it could in
principle be duplicated.
Of course, this becomes more obvious if we're talking about a
conscious AI...
Bruno is considering classical (non-quantum) computation, in which
it's trivially true that data and programmes can be duplicated. As
far as we know, none of those programmes are conscious as yet, but
there isn't any reason why a conscious programme couldn't be
duplicated and one copy sent to a computer in Moscow, and another to
a computer in Washington, which would (given the assumption that
consciousness is the result of computation) be enough for step 3.
However, the average person might have a "So what?" attitude to a
philsophical argument based around a "mere" conscious computer
programme, so I think the reason Bruno uses hypothetical teleporters
is to make it easier for people to get to grips with.
I can't agree more, and that is why term like Pompous addressed
personally, when you are just trying to explain, might seem
deliberately confusing.
Bruno
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