Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Apr 2015, at 03:58, Bruce Kellett wrote:
The digital simulation of brain functions is achieved on a physical
computer after all, which is a physical object itself -- simulating
(primitive) physical processes.
Assuming a physical object, which I do not (nor do I assume they don't
exist). Comp, the hypothesis is nutral on what exist, except for what is
needed to have a UTM, so it assumes one UTM, if you want, but not
necessarily a physical UTM.
You said somewhere that a computation is dynamical, not static, which is
why you rejected the notion that Champernow's number contains all
possible computations and hence is a dovetailer: "(0,1234567891011 ..)
does not emulate anything, despite describing (in some ways) all
computations."
Emulation is a dynamical process in time. I wonder where you get a time
variable for your UTM. All that you say about the UTM and the dovetailer
appears to assume an instantiation in some temporal structure. I do not
see time as a parameter in arithmetic! In other words, your dovetailer
has to be running on a physical UTM. You claim above that it does not
have to be physical. I would like you to point me to a non-physical
Turing machine that actually runs programs. I.e., not just a description
of a Turing machine.
I have downloaded your SANE04 paper and will work through it in time. A
first glance suggests that I will have objections at very many points.
Bruce
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