On Fri, Apr 10, 2015 at 10:43 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > On Thu, Apr 9, 2015 Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote: > > >> >>And now that I have answered you question I repeat my question that you >>> dodged: Who is traveling through time in a forward direction, Mr. John >>> Clark or Mr. John Clark The Helsinki Man? >>> >> >> > Both are. Everyone is. >> > > Then when Mr. John Clark The Helsinki Man says "I will see Moscow" > please explain exactly who the prediction is about. > When Mr. John Clark the pre-double-slit-experiment man says "I will see the electon being detected as going through the right slit" who is this prediction about? > > >> if just before the multiple duplications John Clark predicted that >>> "you" will see X how could it be determined which one of the 6.02 *10^23 is >>> Mr. You so we could ask Mr, You if he did really did see X and figure out >>> if John Clark's prediction was correct? >>> >> >> > John Clark will predict that one will see X1, and that all the other >> Telmos will see all the other Xs. That prediction will be confirmed with >> 100% accuracy. >> > > Yes. So where is the indeterminacy in that? > "Mongolia is a landlocked country." "Yes. So where are the beaches in Mongolia?" > > > If you ask the original Telmo to bet on a destination and he bets on X1, >> the copy at X1 will tell you that he predicted correctly, >> > > Yes. So where is the indeterminacy in that? > "Mongolia is a landlocked country." "Yes. So where are the beaches in Mongolia?" > > > while the copies at the while the copies at the other Xs will tell you >> that they were wrong. Xs will tell you that they were wrong. > > > It wasn't wrong if the prediction was "Telmo will see X1" because every > one of the 6.02 *10^23 Telmos can clearly see that Telmo did indeed see X1. > If the prediction was "I will see X1" then there is no way to know if the > prediction was correct or not because of the inherent ambiguity matter > duplicating machines brings to personal pronouns. > I have this crazy idea to remove the supposed ambiguity: ask a specific Telmo if his prediction was correct or not. > > >> > If you repeat the experiment several times, the Telmos will eventually >> realize that there is a 1/6.02 *10^23 probability for each location, and >> that they are in a state of uncertainty >> > > You don't need exotic matter duplicating machines for this thought > experiment because it's all just old fashioned conventional subjective > uncertainty not the newer objective uncertainty found in Quantum Mechanics. > The copies are uncertain about what they will see only because you have > kept some information from them. > This is false. Both the original and the copies know everything that the experimenter knows about the experiment's protocol. Please tell me what information could be provided to the copies that would change the outcome of the experiment. > You are in charge of the experiment, you are Monty Hall, you always knew > with 100% certainty which door the car was behind, and you determined if > each individual copy sees X1 or not and how information they had about what > your decision would be. So Bruno's thought experiment is no deeper and has > no more philosophical significance than a episode of "Let's Make a Deal". > In "Let's Make a Deal", the host doesn't know which door the contestant will choose. The uncertainty is introduced by keeping information from the contestant. In Bruno's thought experiment, everyone knows the same about the current state of the world. > > > the difference between Many Worlds and the duplication machines is that >> the copies can interact and an outside observer can see several of the >> copies. >> > > And another difference is that personal pronouns work just fine in Many > Worlds but matter duplication machines renders them useless in most > circumstances. > Which is not so surprising, language evolved in a world without duplication machines. Verb tenses also become problematic if you introduce time machines. > > > But the John Clark who wrote the emails no longer exist. >> > > I remember being him and that's good enough for me. > So why wouldn't it be enough for the copies? > > >> > Why is this not a problem for you with emails, not even with many >> worlds, but it becomes a problem with duplication machines? >> > > There is no existential problem, there is only a pronoun problem. If there > will be 6.02 *10^23 copies of me tomorrow then I will certainly exist > tomorrow, but I will no longer be unique, not one of those 6.02 *10^23 > copies has more of a right to call himself Mr. I than another. > "I" is a word that refers to the first person perspective, and everyone has one. I have no more right to call myself Mr. I than you already. What's your point? Creating 6.02 *10^23 copies of you will not change the fact that you have a unique first person perspective of reality, and it will start to differ from the copies from the first instant. > > > Further along the proof everything comes full circle, and you are >> confronted with having to chose between comp (the mind can be replaced by >> an equivalent computation at some correct substitution level) >> > > Obviously true to my mind. > > >> > and materialism -- in this specific case, the claim that position is an >> aspect of fundamental reality, >> > > Obviously ridiculous. > Ok, these are bolder claims than Bruno makes. He just starts with: "if you assume comp...". If these things are so obvious to you, then surely you can prove them or design experiments to test them? I won't hold my breath. > > >> > I can't help but notice, tough, that your distaste for peer pressure is >> quite selective. You are the one who likes to argue every new year that psi >> phenomena do not exist because Nature and Science haven't published a paper >> about them yet. >> > > That is because I can't personally reproduce all the experiments in Nature > and Science, but I know that the editors of Nature and Science have a very > good (but not perfect) track record of not publishing junk science, so by > induction I conclude that what I read is probably true. > No, what you conclude is that what you don't read there is probably false, which is a logical mistake. > But Bruno performed no experiments, > Neither did Gödel. This is not a valid argument, unless you also have a problem with Gödel's results. > and with all the personal pronouns it very quickly became apparent that > Bruno LITERALLY (not figuratively) didn't know what he was talking about. > So far, you failed to produce a valid argument for that statement. > > > To answer your question for the n-th time. John Clark the >> pre-duplication man makes the prediction. Then [..] >> > > Not so fast! First I need to know what you're talking about. Please > specify EXACTLY what the prediction is, and for god's sake give the > personal pronouns a rest. > Show me how to do it. Describe quantum uncertainty according to the MWI without personal pronouns. I know you will be able to do it because: a) you like the MWI b) you hate personal pronouns > > > I believe the arrow of time is seen as an open problem in physics. > > > The arrow of time MUST exist if the universe was created in a very low > entropy condition. How the universe was created in a low entropy condition > is an open problem. > Ok. I have an idea about that, it is probably not original. Tell me what you think: The universe was not created. All possible states just exist. The moment of the big bang is one of the many possible states. What we call the past is a sequence of steps in the state graph that are coherent predecessor of each other, in the sense that they contain less and less information. Given that the moment of the big bang is the lowest entropy state conceivable, all history lines will originate there. Telmo. > > John K Clark > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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