CCT doesn't have to entail physical continuity. The standard CCT seems to first use psychological similarty and in the case of ties physical continuity, but you could also imagine a purely paychological or purely physical CCT. My problem with CCT is that the rules for ties are ad hoc legal arbitration that violate locality and to quote Parfit: "A double survival can't equal death." My problem with similiarity measures is that you are no longer talking about subjective expectation. Similarity measures are fine if you throw out subjective expectation as a mere illusion. However, if you want to retain subjective expectation, then you have to have an all or none model of personal identity.
On Monday, April 20, 2015, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote: > On Tue, Apr 21, 2015 at 08:43:09AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >On 20 Apr 2015, at 09:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > > > >>Dennis Ochei wrote: > > >>>One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity > > >>>because it isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at > > >>>him for explaining combustion without reference to phlogiston. > > >>>He can't use the everyday notion because it is a convenient > > >>>fiction. > > >> > > >>I don't think phlogiston is an everyday concept. The closest > > >>continuer concept of personal identity is far from an > > >>unsophisticated everyday notion, or a convenient fiction. If you > > >>want to revise it to some alternative definition of personal > > >>identity that is better suited to your purposes, then you have > > >>to do the necessary analytical work. > > > > > >Are you saying that you believe that computationalism is false (in > > >which case you can believe in some closer continuer theory), or > > >are you saying that step 4 is not valid? > > > > I am suggesting that computationalism is effectively false, in part > > because of an inadequate account of personal identity. You > > substitute part or all of the brain at some level with a Turing > > machine, but do not take appropriate notice of the body bearing the > > brain. If we are not to notice the substitution, we must still have > > a body that interacts with the world in exactly the same way as the > > original. Under the teleportation scenarios, some new body must be > > created or provided. I think that in general the person might notice > > this. > > > > If you woke up in the morning and looked in the mirror and saw > > Sophia Loren looking back at you, or saw your next door neighbour in > > the mirror, you might doubt your own identity. Memories are not > > everything because memories can be lost, or be mistaken. > > > > In total virtual reality scenarios, of course, this could be > > managed, but then you have the problem of the identity of > > indiscernibles. Creating copies that are identical to this level -- > > identical memories, bodies, environments, and so on -- does not > > duplicate the person -- the copies, being identical in all respects, > > are one person. > > > > I am saying that a case could be made that all the destructive > > teleportation scenarios create new persons -- the cut actually > > terminates the original person. In step 3 you have a tie for closest > > continuer so there is no continuing person -- the original is cut. > > If the original is not cut (as in step 5), then that is the > > continuing person, and the duplicate is a new person. Time delays as > > in steps 2 and 4 do not make a lot of difference, they just enhance > > the need for the recognition of new persons. > > > > In sum, your argument over these early steps is not an argument in > > logic, but an argument of rhetoric. Because the tight definitions > > you need for logical argument either are not provided, or when > > provided, do not refer to anything in the real world, at best you > > are trying to persuade rhetorically -- there is no logical > > compulsion. What you are talking about has more to do with > > psychology and/or physics than mathematics, so definitions can never > > be completely precise -- concepts in the real world are always > > corrigible, so tightly constrained logical arguments are not > > available as they are in mathematics. > > > > Bruce > > > > There is another way of looking at this. Assume a robust ontology, so > that the UD actually runs completely. Then the closest continuation > theory coupled with computationalism predicts the absence of any > discontinuities of experience, such as what I experience evry night > going to sleep. That is because in UD*, there will be always be a > closer continuation to one you're currently experiencing (for > essentially the same reason that there is always another real number > lying between any two real numbers you care to pick. > > So either ontology is not robust (the Peter Jones move), > computationalism is false, or the CCT is false. > > Not sure if Bruno needs to more explicit on this robust ontology bit, > as he deemphasises this until step 7. > > Anyway, it does seem to me that CCT is attributing some sort of > identity role to physical continuity that is not there with > computational continuity. > > -- > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Principal, High Performance Coders > Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au > <javascript:;> > University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/Lp5_VIb6ddY/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com <javascript:;>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <javascript:;>. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- Sent from Gmail Mobile -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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