The discussion was originally about step 3 in the comp argument. Obviously
if we've moved onto something else then comp may not be relevant, however,
if we are still talking about comp then the question of importance is
whether a brain is Turing emulable at any level (which includes whether
physics is Turing emulable). If it is, then either the argument goes
through, or one of Bruno's other premises is wrong, or there is a mistake
in his argument.



On 23 April 2015 at 19:24, Dennis Ochei <do.infinit...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Short of bringing the brain down to absolute zero, im not sure that
> stopping all brain processes is physically meaningful. we could talk about
> stopping all action potentials. I think you might see short term memory
> loss with this but you can probably reboot.
>
>
> On Thursday, April 23, 2015, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
> wrote:
>
>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 23 April 2015 at 16:36, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
>>> <javascript:;>> wrote:
>>>  > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>  >>
>>>  >> On 23 April 2015 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
>>> <javascript:;>>
>>>  >> wrote:
>>>  >>
>>>  >>>>> I doubt that. Is the point susceptible of proof either way? Not
>>> all
>>>  >>>>> brain
>>>  >>>>> processes stop under anaesthesia.
>>>  >>>>
>>>  >>>>
>>>  >>>> When embryos are frozen all metabolic processes stop. On thawing,
>>> the
>>>  >>>> embryo is usually completely normal. If this could be done with a
>>>  >>>> brain would it make any difference in the philosophical discussion?
>>>  >>>
>>>  >>>
>>>  >>> That becomes a hypothetical discussion. Let's do it first and
>>> discuss the
>>>  >>> implications later. I remain sceptical about the possibility. An
>>> embryo
>>>  >>> is
>>>  >>> not an adult brain. Injecting antifreeze to inhibit cell rupturing
>>> might
>>>  >>> have adverse consequences in the brain.
>>>  >>
>>>  >>
>>>  >> In anaesthesia (and even in sleep) metabolic processes involved in
>>>  >> consciousness are suspended without damage to the brain. But this
>>>  >> whole list is hypothetical discussion! Mere technical difficulty does
>>>  >> not affect the philosophical questions.
>>>  >
>>>  >
>>>  > I think it might -- if the technical issues are such that the process
>>> is
>>>  > impossible in principle (for physical reasons).
>>>
>>> Then it wouldn't be a mere technical difficulty. You have to show that
>>> suspending biological processes then restarting them breaks some physical
>>> law, and I don't think that it does.
>>>
>>
>> The argument would be that physical laws stop you restarting the
>> suspended processes -- the suspension process causes irreversible damage,
>> for instance. Irreversible processes are quite plentiful under known
>> physical laws.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
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