On 4/23/2015 1:03 AM, LizR wrote:
The discussion was originally about step 3 in the comp argument. Obviously if we've moved onto something else then comp may not be relevant, however, if we are still talking about comp then the question of importance is whether a brain is Turing emulable at any level (which includes whether physics is Turing emulable). If it is, then either the argument goes through, or one of Bruno's other premises is wrong, or there is a mistake in his argument.
Well, maybe Bruno can clarify. He always says that physics and consciousness are not computable; they are some kind of sum or average over countably infinite many threads going through a particular state of the UD. So it's not that clear what it means that the brain is Turing emulable in Bruno's theory, even if it is Turing emulable in the materialist theory. That's part of my concern that the environment of the brain, the physics of it is relation to the environment, is what makes it not emulable because its perception/awareness is inherently adapted to the environment by evolution. Bruno tends to dismiss this as a technicality because one can just expand the scope of the emulation to include the environment. But I think that's a flaw. If the scope has to be expanded then all that's proven in step 8 is that, within a simulated environment a simulated consciousness doesn't require any real physics - just simulated physics. But that's almost trivial. I say "almost" because it may still provide some explanation of consciousness within the simulation.
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