> On 23 Apr 2015, at 8:06 pm, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> Sorry to go off topic so soon :-) but at first glance the answer to this 
> would appear to depend completely on the answer to Bruno's "yes doctor" - if 
> one's consciousness is the result of computation at some level, and assuming 
> Bruno's chain of reasoning is correct, then a destructive upload should be 
> possible, and a conservative upload would give you a 50-50 chance of finding 
> yourself uploaded. If there is something wrong with comp, e.g. non Turing 
> emulable processes are involved, then it seems unlikely that any type of 
> upload will upload you - unless you have a soul or something, in which case 
> there is a 50-50 chance that a conservative upload will either kill the 
> original anyway, or turn it into a zombie, or that the uploaded version will 
> be soulless, whatever that means.
> 
> Another take on this is Tipler's, as used in "The Physics of Immortality", 
> which is to assume that a simulation of the quantum state of your brain will 
> be you (and hence we could be in an ancestor simulation, or wake up in one at 
> any moment - if such things are possible, and are of high enough fidelity to 
> reproduce simulated quantum states, and will actually exist somewhere, at 
> some point in time - this is similar to a "Boltzman brain" argument, I 
> suspect). I don't have enough knowledge of the relevant physics to comment on 
> that one.


Not forgetting good ol' Nick Bostrom and the evergreen 'Simulation Argument'

Was it Frank's idea originally? I always attributed this to Bostrom.

http://www.simulation-argument.com/

K





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