How about this? MWI, if true, refutes the no-clonning conundrum.  


-----Original Message-----
From: LizR <[email protected]>
To: everything-list <[email protected]>
Sent: Thu, Apr 23, 2015 5:39 pm
Subject: Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading


 
  
   
On 24 April 2015 at 06:39, spudboy100 via Everything List     
<[email protected]> wrote:    
    
     My sense of things is that if it's not your identity who's is it then? 
Pattern identity sorts it out. If it looks like you, and it thinks like you, 
has your attitudes, opinions, belief's, prejudices, likes, dislikes, feels like 
you, feels like your own tongue in your own mouth...that's you.     
    
     
    
    
The question is whether the you who was a biological entity experiences waking 
up as the uploaded version. If not, then to quote Larry Niven "I wouldn't rise 
in the damn thing" (a destructive teleporter, in his case).    
    
     
    
    
Tipler claims that is guaranteed if you can duplicate - or, apparently, just 
simulate - the quantum state of your body (or brain, at least). That is, with 
no supernatural extras, the laws of physicss (supposedly) guarantee that a 
duplicated quantum state is indeed you, and you will actually experience waking 
up as the new version. (Indeed, the MWI also relies on this identity thesis to 
explain how observers can exist in a branching multiverse - and so does comp, 
of course.)    
    
     
    
    
But there's no-cloning to consider - plus whether a simulated quantum state is 
the same as a real one...    
    
     
    
     Pattern identity says the body is the soul and identity. Easy, Peasy. If 
there are a million of you, with that feeling, and they all go off to have a 
million different experiences, going forward, then hypothetically, you all can 
meet at the end of time, so to speak, and all join together (Tipler style) into 
one totally, cosmic Liz. According to Steinhart, uploading is resurrection, or 
at least one branch of resurrection.     
    
     
   
  
 
  
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