LizR wrote:
On 5 May 2015 at 16:15, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
I agree. In fact, I think it is a weakness of Bruno's argument that
he starts from the "yes doctor" scenario rather than from a simple
assumption of strong AI. The problem might be that *we* cannot have
first person experience of being a 'strong AI being'.
Strong AI and "Yes Doctor" both follow from the assumption that
consciousness is the result of computation. I have used strong AI a few
times on this list in an effort to persuade people who are hung up on
the feasibility of duplicating machines, pronouns and similar
irrelevancies to actually address the arguments Bruno is making.
In any case, even starting from the assumption that only /human/
consciousness is computational, Bruno still reaches strong AI by about
step 5.
If you believe in Platonia, then the computation that
instantiates the consciousness (and everyone else's
consciousness) is a mathematical object and hence "exists"
independent of its particular physical instantiation. All the
physical world is inferred from conscious experience (I find
this dubious too) and so the computations in Platonia that
instantiate conscious thoughts, also instantiate the physical
world those thoughts refer to.
Like strong AI in a virtual world. I think that is what comp is
actually saying -- we are just that, nothing more. Whether this
emerges from arithmetic, or is basically physical, remains
unknowable in comp.
It can only be physical if the universe is robust. I think the ponit of
comp is more that there is no /need/ to bring in the "physical
hypothesis" if the UDA is correct - it becomes superfluous, since we can
explain the appearance of a physical world without requiring it.
Actually, strong AI in a virtual world does not need the dovetailer or a
robust universe. If one can make use of the existing physical world and
the laws it displays, we do not need to extract these from arithmetic
and the infinity of computations of the UD. It is the UD which is
superfluous.
This is, after all, the simpler hypothesis.
Bruce
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