On Saturday, May 16, 2015, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > On 5/15/2015 10:10 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > > On 13 May 2015, at 11:59 am, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jasonre...@gmail.com');>> wrote: > > Chalmer's fading quailia argument <http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html> > shows that if replacing a biological neuron with a functionally equivalent > silicon neuron changed conscious perception, then it would lead to an > absurdity, either: > 1. quaila fade/change as silicon neurons gradually replace the biological > ones, leading to a case where the quaila are being completely out of touch > with the functional state of the brain. > or > 2. the replacement eventually leads to a sudden and complete loss of all > quaila, but this suggests a single neuron, or even a few molecules of that > neuron, when substituted, somehow completely determine the presence of > quaila > > His argument is convincing, but what happens when we replace neurons not > with functionally identical ones, but with neurons that fire according to a > RNG. In all but 1 case, the random firings of the neurons will result in > completely different behaviors, but what about that 1 (immensely rare) case > where the random neuron firings (by chance) equal the firing patterns of > the substituted neurons. > > In this case, behavior as observed from the outside is identical. Brain > patterns and activity are similar, but according to computationalism the > consciousness is different, or perhaps a zombie (if all neurons are > replaced with random firing neurons). Presume that the activity of neurons > in the visual cortex is required for visual quaila, and that all neurons in > the visual cortex are replaced with random firing neurons, which by chance, > mimic the behavior of neurons when viewing an apple. > > Is this not an example of fading quaila, or quaila desynchronized from > the brain state? Would this person feel that they are blind, or lack visual > quaila, all the while not being able to express their deficiency? I used to > think when Searle argued this exact same thing would occur when substituted > functionally identical biological neurons with artificial neurons that it > was completely ridiculous, for there would be no room in the functionally > equivalent brain to support thoughts such as "help! I can't see, I am > blind!" for the information content in the brain is identical when the > neurons are functionally identical. > > But then how does this reconcile with fading quaila as the result of > substituting randomly firing neurons? The computations are not the same, so > presumably the consciousness is not the same. But also, the information > content does not support knowing/believing/expressing/thinking something is > wrong. If anything, the information content of this random brain is much > less, but it seems the result is something where the quaila is out of sync > with the global state of the brain. Can anyone else where shed some clarity > on what they think happens, and how to explain it in the rare case of > luckily working randomly firing neurons, when only partial substitutions of > the neurons in a brain is performed? > > > So Jason, are you still convinced that the random neurons would not be > conscious? If you are, you are putting the cart before the horse. The > fading qualia argument makes the case that any process preserving function > also preserves consciousness. Any process; that computations are one such > process is fortuitous. > > > But that seems unlikely. How much function, for how long, in what > circumstances? For a millisecond? >
For theoretical purposes we consider perfect replication of function, but if these machines are ever made they will presumably be specified to work within a certain tolerance. Probably a millisecond wouldn't work since we don't experience consciousness of that duration. > Does "function" include the internal functions such as neurons firing? > hormones diffusing? or just sending output electrical pulses to muscles? > Function involves any cognitive activity. Usually this manifests as impulses to muscles, although you can think without moving. I would say just getting the pattern of neural firing correct would be enough. Internal neural processes, hormones, glial cells affect the pattern of neural firing and ultimately behaviour. > You write "any process", apparently including random/accidental ones. So > how are we to decide whether my car is conscious? It executes processes > and functions. > Your car would still work if the cylinders in the engine moved miraculously in the same manner as they do normally. I'm not sure if this would preserve its consciousness if it had any - maybe the combustion of fuel is important in car consciousness. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
