On 18 May 2015 at 16:04, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Sat, May 16, 2015 at 12:10 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> On 13 May 2015, at 11:59 am, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Chalmer's fading quailia argument shows that if replacing a biological >> neuron with a functionally equivalent silicon neuron changed conscious >> perception, then it would lead to an absurdity, either: >> 1. quaila fade/change as silicon neurons gradually replace the biological >> ones, leading to a case where the quaila are being completely out of touch >> with the functional state of the brain. >> or >> 2. the replacement eventually leads to a sudden and complete loss of all >> quaila, but this suggests a single neuron, or even a few molecules of that >> neuron, when substituted, somehow completely determine the presence of >> quaila >> >> His argument is convincing, but what happens when we replace neurons not >> with functionally identical ones, but with neurons that fire according to a >> RNG. In all but 1 case, the random firings of the neurons will result in >> completely different behaviors, but what about that 1 (immensely rare) case >> where the random neuron firings (by chance) equal the firing patterns of the >> substituted neurons. >> >> In this case, behavior as observed from the outside is identical. Brain >> patterns and activity are similar, but according to computationalism the >> consciousness is different, or perhaps a zombie (if all neurons are replaced >> with random firing neurons). Presume that the activity of neurons in the >> visual cortex is required for visual quaila, and that all neurons in the >> visual cortex are replaced with random firing neurons, which by chance, >> mimic the behavior of neurons when viewing an apple. >> >> Is this not an example of fading quaila, or quaila desynchronized from the >> brain state? Would this person feel that they are blind, or lack visual >> quaila, all the while not being able to express their deficiency? I used to >> think when Searle argued this exact same thing would occur when substituted >> functionally identical biological neurons with artificial neurons that it >> was completely ridiculous, for there would be no room in the functionally >> equivalent brain to support thoughts such as "help! I can't see, I am >> blind!" for the information content in the brain is identical when the >> neurons are functionally identical. >> >> But then how does this reconcile with fading quaila as the result of >> substituting randomly firing neurons? The computations are not the same, so >> presumably the consciousness is not the same. But also, the information >> content does not support knowing/believing/expressing/thinking something is >> wrong. If anything, the information content of this random brain is much >> less, but it seems the result is something where the quaila is out of sync >> with the global state of the brain. Can anyone else where shed some clarity >> on what they think happens, and how to explain it in the rare case of >> luckily working randomly firing neurons, when only partial substitutions of >> the neurons in a brain is performed? >> >> >> So Jason, are you still convinced that the random neurons would not be >> conscious? > > > I believe that is consistent according to computationalism. > >> >> If you are, you are putting the cart before the horse. The fading qualia >> argument makes the case that any process preserving function also preserves >> consciousness. > > > But that argument only stands (I think) in the case of functional > equivalence (at some level). In this case the functions were defined to not > be equivalent, well in terms of input and output they are equivalent, but > the computational implementation is definitely different. Perhaps this is > just a case where the equivalency between functionalism and computationalism > breaks down (if by functionalism, we count only inputs and outputs).
It is the function that be be equivalent, not the computations; otherwise, it's like insisting that only meat can think. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
