On 19 May 2015 at 14:45, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Mon, May 18, 2015 at 9:21 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> > wrote: >> >> On 19 May 2015 at 11:02, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> > I think you're not taking into account the level of the functional >> > substitution. Of course functionally equivalent silicon and functionally >> > equivalent neurons can (under functionalism) both instantiate the same >> > consciousness. But a calculator computing 2+3 cannot substitute for a >> > human >> > brain computing 2+3 and produce the same consciousness. >> >> In a gradual replacement the substitution must obviously be at a level >> sufficient to maintain the function of the whole brain. Sticking a >> calculator in it won't work. >> >> > Do you think a "Blockhead" that was functionally equivalent to you (it >> > could >> > fool all your friends and family in a Turing test scenario into thinking >> > it >> > was intact you) would be conscious in the same way as you? >> >> Not necessarily, just as an actor may not be conscious in the same way >> as me. But I suspect the Blockhead would be conscious; the intuition >> that a lookup table can't be conscious is like the intuition that an >> electric circuit can't be conscious. >> > > I don't see an equivalency between those intuitions. A lookup table has a > bounded and very low degree of computational complexity: all answers to all > queries are answered in constant time. > > While the table itself may have an arbitrarily high information content, > what in the software of the lookup table program is there to > appreciate/understand/know that information?
Understanding emerges from the fact that the lookup table is immensely large. It could be wrong, but I don't think it is obviously less plausible than understanding emerging from a Turing machine made of tin cans. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
