On 05 Jun 2015, at 06:59, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Jun 4, 2015 , Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:

> The point is just that the notion of computation, once you agree with Church-Turing thesis, is made into a purely arithmetical notion.

That is incorrect. The Church-Turing thesis says that a function on the positive and negative integers is computable if and only if it is computable on a Turing Machine; and if the Turing Machine is not made of matter that obeys the laws of physics then the "machine" is useless because it does absolutely positively nothing.


I begin to think that you are attempting to become the champion of nonsense.

Turing machine are not made of matter, and computation is definable in arithmetic, just using the symbol s, 0, + * and the usual logical symbol. We can even eliminate the "A" (for all) quantifier.




> You can define computable and finite piece of computation by one precise combinators, or one precise number, or one precise diophantine polynomials, etc.

YOU CAN'T MAKE A COMPUTATION WITH A DEFINITION!!

But the point is that we don"t have to made them once you agree that 2+2=4 does not depend on matter, and that is the case, by definition of the notions involved.




> You are the one invoking some God (Matter) capable of making some computation more real than others.

It could not be clearer that some calculations ARE more real than others.

Relatively? Sure. I have to pay by national taxes, that's real and important to avoid real problems, but that is not relevant. Again, you beg the question if you say that the physical computations are more real. you could say that only those blessed by the Pope are really real ...



Matter can make calculations that I can see, but your calculations are invisible;

Like the numbers. But in the computation which exist in arithmetic, some emulate person seeing object.

You could say that there is no real driving car, or any movement, in a block-universe, as there is no time there, and we need time to measure the presence of movement. But we have no problem because those notions are relative. Similarly here. That is why the notions of points of view is capital in the computationalist approach.


the transubstantiation in the Catholic Mass that turns bread and wine into the body and blood of Jesus Christ is also invisible. As I've said, being invisible and being nonexistent look rather similar

Assuming some aristotelian theological dogma.






> comp, explains the physical, from machine self-referential properties, and so can be translated in arithmetic to give the proposition logic of physics.

  I don't care, I'm not interested in "comp".


Then why do you participate in this list where comp and its (meta)- physical consequences are discussed since about 20 years?

- You agree with the multiverse. Some (rare) physicists have criticized my thesis (without reading it) because they were told that I defend Everett, and that was enough for them, (which, btw, is false, as I do not defend any thesis). - You agree with comp, and might be said being, like Hal Finney, a real comp practitioners.
- You agree that physics might not be fundamental.

So what?

You would disagree only because you would have found a flaw in step 3, without ever being able to convince anyone on this?

or because, CT would use physics? (But you have not find "serious" confirmation on this on the net, and still deny).

or you want just be disagreeable?

or what?

I tell you that I can decompose step 3 in smaller steps, ... but recently, even 14 years old children told me that this was necessary only for the 12 years old one! Indeed, if you take the definition which are given, this is 3p obvious (and you said so yourself), so nobody in this list or elsewhere understand why you don't move on the other steps. Yet, you keep the tone "everyone know that this is just peepee". That shows that it is purely rhetorical dismiss.

I am not sure I can see what is your problem.
It does look personal, given the constant ad hominem way of addressing the posts.

Bruno





  John K Clark



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to