On 6/10/2015 4:55 PM, LizR wrote:
On 11 June 2015 at 11:38, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
<mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:15, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of
mind. What
is not Turing emulable in the brain?
Its interaction with the universe.
Are you sure it is not the interaction with God?
Dunno, Samiya seems to the expert on what God does.
Can you explain why such interaction is not computable?
No, I was relying on your assertion that physics is not computable -
which would
entail that brain processes are not computable, which would imply that
comp1 is
false. Except there's a loophole: if comp1 means replacement by a
physical
object then the physics of that object is not computable either and so
it might
work.
Yes, that does seem to follow. And the brain replacement might happen to work, but we'd
have no idea how (magic? supernatural?)
I suspect that "physics is not computable" is the /end/ result of Brnuo's argument
(comp2) - which is supposed to be a /reductio/ on the notion of comp1. So comp1 assumes
that physics is computable, and that assumption leads to the result that it isn't.
But I don't see that it leads to that result. His argument of step 7 and the MGA purport
to reach a /reductio/ from comp1. Those arguments are still assuming that thought is a
computation. But it is only after he introduces the idea of all possible computations and
the UD that he then asserts that consciousness (and physics) is not computable but is
rather some kind of statistic mechanics of computational threads.
Brent
Which is taken as an argument against physical supervenience of consciousness on
brains, although it could equally be an argument against brains performing computations.
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