Yes, Professor, for me 10^10^100000 is a Real Number. I will define "pebbles" as nuggets of silicon-oxdie-ferrites, that mass at under 1400 grams, down to 2 milligrams. This is totally arbitrary a description, which I am content with.
Platonic programs are likely not a bomb, but an area of mathematical physics that will need to be hunted for by very, bright, researchers. This is just like Stephen Wolfram's view that specific cosmic existences, even intelligences, all by computing sequences, or sets. Do I agree with this, well, I'd like to. -----Original Message----- From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> To: everything-list <[email protected]> Sent: Mon, Jun 29, 2015 9:24 am Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark On 29 Jun 2015, at 01:34, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: Take an intelligent observer counting pebbles on a rocky beach (a not very wise observer) thus, an unknown quantity, become computable. A function from N to N is computable if a fixed finite machine can find the right (finite) output when presented an (finite) input, and this in a finite time. Counting pebble is ambiguous. We lack a definition of pebble, counting, etc. It's not computable if there's nobody to do the counting. Well, you might confuse computable and computed. Once we accept Church's thesis (one half of computationalism) a function ( a subset of NxN) is computable, or not. Either the machine exists, or not, independently of the fact that the machine is build or not. Do you agree that above 1000^1000 there are still prime numbers? If yes, such a notion of computability should make sense to you. In your view, the platonist must incur embedded programs, although Plato may never have dreamed of a program, or what it was? Yes, that is the big bomb in Platonism: the discovery of the universal machine and the notion of programs/machines/numbers/codes. Maybe the first Platonists would not have appreciated them, as it introduces chaos in Platonia, but eventually this is what saves platonism and neoplatonism from inconsistency, even if the price can be judged big: the long term abandon of the idea of material reality, which appears, when we bet on mechanism, as a sort of unusable phlogiston. Bruno -----Original Message----- From: Bruno Marchal < [email protected]> To: everything-list < [email protected]> Sent: Sun, Jun 28, 2015 11:13 am Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark On 28 Jun 2015, at 15:07, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: My retort is: I am material, I, as a body follow the laws of physics and chemistry, thus, I am computable, (Does not compute! exclaimed the Robot from Lost in Space). It is not obvious that "physical" entails "computable". Arithmetical, for example, does not entail computable, although the reverse is true. Bruno -----Original Message----- From: Bruno Marchal < [email protected]> To: everything-list < [email protected]> Sent: Sun, Jun 28, 2015 5:24 am Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark On 27 Jun 2015, at 13:33, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: I was thinking of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, when I wrote that yesterday. Yet, there are papers based on experiments weaken the hold that Heisenberg portrays. I am betting that all things are computable and there is nothing that can be considered non computable. I guess that at the root of everything that occurs, be it human spit, or a galaxy, are all based, or derived from computation. Indeed, that a great computation set off the Big Bang, and that computation yields everything from stones to stellar gases. Am I convincing? No. Because I am stating what I suspect is true. Any and all may disagree. Can love be computable? Well, yes, or at least aspects of it. Moreover, I don't see where all things cannot be computable. This is not a life-long belief, but something I arrived at recently, after viewing papers and articles in physics and computing. If its all numbers organized into equations, and equations arranged into coding, I can't see how I can be wrong. You described the point which starts this all. But you seem to forget the FPI. The idea that the whole of physics is computable is inconsistent. It would entail that "I am computable", and this entails, by the FPI, that physics is not computable a priori (or that my generalized brain is the whole universe). Bruno Mitch -----Original Message----- From: Stathis Papaioannou < [email protected]> To: everything-list < [email protected]> Sent: Fri, Jun 26, 2015 11:08 pm Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark On Saturday, June 27, 2015, spudboy100 via Everything List < [email protected]> wrote: But surely phenomena in quantum physics and Conways Life are random, but computable? GOL is deterministic. Quantum mechanics (under any interpretation) results in true randomness which is not computable. For example, it is impossible to predict if an isotope will decay in a particular time period. Under the MWI quantum mechanics is deterministic: the isotope will definitely decay in one universe and not decay in another. However, an observer cannot predict which universe he will end up in, so non-computable randomness returns, despite the overall determinism. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
