On Thu, Jun 25, 2015 at 2:43 PM, Terren Suydam <[email protected]> wrote:
> > Do you take the same position with regard to many-worlds style splitting > experiments? > No. Everett's Many Worlds contains no ambiguity but Bruno's thought experiment has nothing but ambiguity . In Many Worlds the word "you" causes no problems, if duplicating chambers haven't been invented yet then "you" is the only chunk of matter that the laws of physics allow John Clark to observe that are arranged in a Terren s uydam ian way. There is no ambiguity, everything is clear as a bell. B ut in Bruno's thought experiment there is a man standing to the right of the duplicating machine who looks like Terren Suydam and a n identical looking man standing to the left of the duplicating machine and they both passionately insist that they are Terren Suydam and both have a equal right to use the grand title "you". Another difference is that Bruno and Everett are trying to explain different things. Everett's Many Worlds Theory is trying to make predictions and explain why they are probabilistic, and in that he was successful. In contrast Bruno wants to cast insight on the nature of consciousness, but predictions have nothing to do with the sense of personal identity, not good predictions, not bad predictions, and not probabilistic predictions. So Everett accomplished what he set out to do but Bruno did not. > > assuming the many-worlds interpretation, do you say that there is a 1/2 > probability we will open the door and find a dead cat? Yes because I know exactly what " we will open the door " means, it contains no ambiguity. I also know why you were the Dead Cat Man and not the Live Cat Man, it's because you saw a dead cat. And again the word "you" has no ambiguity. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
