"For each according to their observation state, to each according to their needs." Bawh hah hah, Tovaritch. Is good?
-----Original Message----- From: David Nyman <[email protected]> To: everything-list <[email protected]> Sent: Tue, Aug 11, 2015 1:57 pm Subject: Re: Re: MWI question for the physicists... On 11 August 2015 at 07:09, 'scerir' via Everything List <[email protected]> wrote: BTW there is an amusing paper by (the manyworlder) Lev Vaidman. http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9609006 Nice paper (from a while back). AFAICT his resolution of the indeterminacy issue in MWI is logically identical to Bruno's FPI in the context of computationalism. In other words, in both cases it is an 'illusion of ignorance' attributable to the limitation on information available to each 'copy' of a deterministically proliferated observer. Each copy will inevitably (and subjectively justifiably) identify itself as a continuation of a common 'ancestor'. Each observer will therefore feel justified in making probabilistic predictions based on its *subjective restriction* to an apparently (but, sub specie aeternitatis, illusorilly) singular personal history. According to Vaidman this is essentially what the paper is about. I'm frankly staggered that this (i.e. the equivalence between the two forms of FPI) can be in the least controversial at this stage. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
