On 07 Aug 2016, at 15:06, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Friday, 5 August 2016, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 05 Aug 2016, at 06:27, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/4/2016 7:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 August 2016 at 04:01, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 8/4/2016 2:57 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
The problem with (3) is a general problem with multiverses. A
single, infinite universe is an example of a multiverse theory,
since there will be infinite copies of everything and every
possible variation of everything, including your brain and your
mind.
That implicitly assumes a digital universe, yet the theory that
suggests it, quantum mechanics, is based on continua; which is why
I don't take "the multiverse" too seriously.
It appears that our brains are finite state machines. Each neuron
can either be "on" or "off", there are a finite number of neurons,
so a finite number of possible brain states, and a finite number
of possible mental states. This is analogous to a digital computer:
Not necessarily. A digital computer also requires that time be
digitized so that its registers run synchronously. Otherwise "the
state" is ill defined. The finite speed of light means that
spacially separated regions cannot be synchronous. Even if neurons
were only ON or OFF, which they aren't, they have frequency
modulation, they are not synchronous.
Synchronous digital machine can emulate asynchronous digital
machine, and that is all what is needed for the reasoning.
Bruno
even if you postulate that electric circuit variables are
continuous, transistors can only be on or off. If the number of
possible mental states is finite, then in an infinite universe,
whether continuous or discrete, mental states will repeat.
We live in an orderly world with consistent physical laws. It
seems to me that you are suggesting that if everything possible
existed then we would not live in such an orderly world,
Unless the worlds were separated in some way, which current
physical theories provide - but which is not explicable if you
divorce conscious thoughts from physics.
The worlds are physically separated - there can be no
communication between separate worlds in the multiverse and none
between sufficiently widely separated copies of subsets of the
world in an infinite single universe. But the separate copies are
connected insofar as they share memories and sense of identity,
even if there is no causal connection between them.
Of course "copy" implies a shared past in which there was an
"original", they have a cause in common.
Brent
A copy can be prepared using the original as template but it can
also be prepared by exhaustively enumerating every possible variant
of an entity,
Like in the sigma_1 arithmetic, or the UD. OK.
in which case there is no causal link.
Absolutely.
That shows that machine can share a past, or better: a memory of the
past, without any causal link. That happens an infinity of time in the
(sigma_1) arithmetic. of course at step 3, we have reason to related
the memories to the physical history. But that leads to the difficulty
in step seven;
That is part of the measure problem, and eventually physical causality
has to be an emergent pattern. It works at the limit of the FPI. This
is not directly 3p descriptible, as the FPI abstracts all number-of-
steps delays on all computations, and technically, we get only first
person singular and first person plural notion.
We cannot use the physical causality as the selector of computation,
for precisely what you say: we can share memories of past and of goals
for the future without any causal link. That is the case for all
"Maury-effect" programs, which are large program starting from a big
input describing your current computational states, and leading to
white rabbits dreams or white noise. We have to show how, whatever has
emerged below our substitution level manage to keep the white rabbits
away.
Self-reference indicates a quantization which promises the needed
"anti-white rabbits", and the minimization of aberrance by phase
randomization.
Bruno
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Stathis Papaioannou
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