On 9 August 2016 at 03:52, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

>
>
> On 8/8/2016 6:18 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, 8 August 2016, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 8/7/2016 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> Not necessarily. A digital computer also requires that time be digitized
>>>> so that its registers run synchronously.  Otherwise "the state" is ill
>>>> defined.  The finite speed of light means that spacially separated regions
>>>> cannot be synchronous.  Even if neurons were only ON or OFF, which they
>>>> aren't, they have frequency modulation, they are not synchronous.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Synchronous digital machine can emulate asynchronous digital machine,
>>> and that is all what is needed for the reasoning.
>>>
>>
>> If the time variable is continuous, i.e. can't be digitized, I don't
>> think you are correct.
>>
>
> If time is continuous, you would need infinite precision to exactly define
> the timing of a neuron's excitation, so you are right, that would not be
> digitisable. Practically, however, brains would have to have a non-zero
> engineering tolerance, or they would be too unstable. The gravitational
> attraction of a passing ant would slightly change the timing of neural
> activity, leading to a change in mental state and behaviour.
>
>
> I agree that brains must be essentially classical computers, but no
> necessarily digital.  The question arose as to what was contained in an
> Observer Moment and whether, in an infinite universe there would
> necessarily be infinitely many exact instances of the same OM.
>

Even in a continuum, there would be brain states and mental states that are
effectively identical to an arbitrary level of precision. We maintain a
sense of continuity of identity despite sometimes even gross changes to our
brain. At some threshold there will be a perceptible change, but the
threshold is not infinitesimal.


>   But having a continuous variable doesn't imply instability.   First, the
> passing ant is also instantiated infinitely many times.  Second, if a small
> cause has only a proportionately small effect then there is no
> "instability", more likely the dynamics diverge as in deterministic chaos.
> But in any case it would allow an aleph-1 order infinity of  OMs which
> would differ by infinitesimal amounts.
>
> But I also question the coherence of this idea.  As discussed (at great
> length) by Bruno and JKC, two or more identical brains must instantiate the
> same experience, i.e. the same OM.  So if there are only a finite number of
> possible brain-states and universes are made of OMs, then there can only be
> a finite number of finite universes.
>

A human brain can probably only have a finite number of thoughts, being of
finite size, but a turing machine is not so limited.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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